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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOUTH ASIAN CASTE AND MEDITERRANIAN CITIZENSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLASSES AND THE STATE¹

Stephen L. Mikesell
Jamuna Shrestha

Introduction

Kinship organized societies have often been seen as being pre-state and acephalous. In the Indian subcontinent, this understanding has taken the form of a dichotomy between the division of "tribal" society versus "caste" society, in which caste and tribe are perceived as falling at two ends of a continuum. Often, the transformation from "caste" to "tribal" has been conceived within a framework of "Hinduization," in which societies move not only along the continuum from tribe to caste, but from stateless to state. Along the way, this framework has picked up Robert Redfield's dichotomization between the Great Tradition of the Hinduized society and the Little Tradition of the tribal society. There are often implicit values that disparage tribal society, due to their statelessness, while Hinduization is seen as an advance over tribal society.

These authors, however, feel that shift of the analysis of caste from a typological approach and a continuum between opposites to a developmental and comparative approach will be useful. They argue that caste arose historically to solve problems that were also being faced elsewhere throughout the world in the transition from states organized on the basis of kinship to ones organized on the basis of property and class. These changes arose out of the growth of productive forces available to humankind represented in the domestication of plants and animals and the accompanying developments of tools, the rise of the city, new forms of knowledge and so forth. Even before the initial transformations of clan society into the first, "pristine" urban societies, the elements that underlay caste were well developed. In particular, these were the displacement of communal property

and a division of labor organized within the framework of kinship categories by private property and a division of labor organized according to class. Caste was one way that this new organization exerted and expanded itself according to the logic and form of clan organization, even while it destroyed such organization in substance.

Whereas caste and class are sometimes presented in comparison to each other as mutually exclusive, if not opposites, these authors argue that this opposition is not an essential one. Caste was just one of the forms taken by the development and expansion of class society and private property, and not necessarily a form essentially different from institutions in western society. The key is not the ideology of hierarchy, although hierarchy is contained in both, but the manner that people who find themselves in intercourse are disenfranchised or enfranchised in society and distributed within the production process and in the enjoyment of the fruits of production. Similar problems were being addressed by "citizenship," which appeared in the Northern Mediterranean, while caste was developing in South Asia. Each arose out of the same processes, both, initially at least, took the clan as their basis and expressed the rise of the city and urban classes, but each addressed different conditions and needs.

Prior Development of the State within the Lineage

At the core of the theory of the state is the problem of the origin and development of the division of labor, classes, property and consciousness, Aidan Southall (1956, 1984 a & b, 1986) argues that these processes initially arose *sui generis* from within kinship organized societies (he refers to the term the "lineage mode of production") in the course of the evolutionary development of human society. Southall calls this early form of state the "segmentary state," which he sees as a particular developmental stage of society and the state.² In addition to a genetic stage in the development of the state, he also sees the segmentary state as a generic type of state, applicable in comparisons between different times and places.

This "segmentary" state form developed merely through extension and elaboration of lineage relations and institutions. The division of labor within the lineage is based on what have been called "natural traits," i.e., gender and age, although except for bearing of children the division of labor generally is a social product. What has been called the "first true division of labor," between physical and mental labor, was defined according to age. Within the lineage group, elder women and men who generally had the wisdom that comes with age, also usually were the ritual functionaries. They controlled the ritualized communication with the spirits and gods backed with the sanction of wisdom.

In this way these rituals served to preserve or reproduce the division of labor and distribution of the product within and between lineage groups from generation to generation. Prior to domestication of plants and animals, only limited surpluses could be accumulated, which meant one group of humans was unable to set itself over others through accretion and control of the products of labor, i.e. through private property. Labor thus was controlled or brought together for common projects through relations of kinship using ritualized sanctions. Just as elders within the lineage group set themselves over younger, lineages representing themselves in mythology as having descended from elder siblings (sisters or brothers, for matrilineal and patrilineal societies, respectively) set themselves over younger siblings. Using this logic, it was possible for groups to invade an area and set themselves over another group by claiming certain privileged relations with spirits and gods, such as for making rain or ensuring availability of game. These ritual powers would provide them the means to demand various forms of tribute of labor or products. If prestations failed to materialize, the ritual leaders could threaten to withhold rain or make game scarce, bringing disaster to the society.³

Members of local lineage groups established themselves over an area by making claims to common descent from ancestors projected as elder to the ancestors of other groups, or else to unrelated but ritually privileged ancestors. In order to place these individuals in a comparative perspective, Southall (1956, 1986) calls them "ritual leaders" and their direct power over nearby local lineage groups "political sovereignty." Their direct power is limited, due to limited productive forces and a lack of basis in private property in land, which is held communally. But they still have an authority over much wider areas through which they can demand certain prestations, called "ritual suzerainty," backed up by sanctions such as the threat of descending upon recalcitrant villages with their entire entourage and staying as uninvited guests until their hosts' stores of food and drink are gone--- in effect looting them of all their provisions by means of the hospitality that lesser lineages must pay to members of higher ones.

Thus, within a kin framework such as of what have historically been called "tribal societies" in South Asian ethnography, we see the emergence or existence of states, even if they may be highly diffuse, decentralized and relatively egalitarian. There is a *division of labor* which demands transfers of labor from certain groups and provides ritual services in the other direction from others. This division of labor further determines a certain distribution of labor and products between groups of people who produce and groups who enjoy the products; thus, there is a nascent "private property," which is in effect the same thing as distribution but from the perspective of norms and

sanctions. However, as long as the same productive activities are reproduced within every local group, no matter what its lineage status, we cannot say that these are fully developed class societies or that private property proper exists (this ceases to hold as soon as a lineage organized society has entered into intercourse with a dominant class society, such as in the colonial situation). The state exists in the form of a set of institutions available to the members of the dominant lineage groups through which they enforce the property form, in this case the various rituals and associated supernatural sanctions. Southall (1954, 1986) termed such a state "segmentary," because it was segmented both vertically, between higher and lower status lineages, and horizontally, between segments of the same lineage; beyond shared mythology and ritual there were not yet separate, unitary state institutions which appeared to have autonomy separate from the fractures of the rest of the society.

In order to explain how members of a clan or caste of ritual leaders could set themselves over other clans, Southall (1986) refers to Godelier's position that the "relations of domination and exploitation presented themselves as an exchange of services to get themselves accepted, and to obtain the consent of the dominated" (Godelier 1978:767). However, "exchange" implies interaction between two different communities, which already anticipates not only more fully developed forms of property beyond that found in lineage organized societies, in which large segments of the society existed outside of or are alien to the community as in non-citizen or foreign groups of some sort. It is simpler to propose that ritual leaders would have based their position on the already existing relationships of seniority and gender and their accompanying ritual paraphernalia, all of which have been already repeatedly attributed to clan relations by anthropologists (e.g., clans said to have been founded by elder siblings are attributed higher status than those of younger ones, and those of maternal ancestors are different in status than those of paternal ones). If individuals of dominant clans imposed themselves in these terms, with their accompanying ritual statuses and material rights and obligations vis-a-vis each other (and I think that Southall's data and analysis both point to this), then it is unnecessary to explain relations in terms of exchange.

Finally, women had a prominent, equal and even powerful role in such societies. Production and social intercourse were based within the household and local lineage group, where women were central to all kinds of production. Given furthermore that power--- i.e., access to human labor was based in the inclusions of as wide a group of lineages as possible, then unrestricted linkages through both marriage and descent and through wives and daughters as well as sons and brothers were instrumental. As we will see, this situation

changes with the development of private property.

Within Nepal, it is evident that such segmentary states existed within the Kirat areas until recently. The history from Prithivi Narayan Shah's time can give a pretty good idea of how they have been subordinated. They also probably were the state form that characterized the Gurung and Magar areas west of the Trisuli River. Bahra Magarat ('Twelve Magarats'), with its 12 divisions, seems to have represented 12 centers of sovereignty organized within the framework of lineages. Among the Gurung, there seem to have been ritually dominant clans versus subordinate ones, although there has been a tendency to characterize these as "Jats", subsequent to their subordination to private property and class society organized in terms of caste. The Ghato dance drama, which has been attributed as a normative element of a separate "Gurung culture," seems to have been performed widely by the Magar speaking people as well, although it disappeared sooner due to their earlier direct subordination. Thus Mikesell (1988) tentatively argues that the Ghato represented a ritual sovereignty that transcended both groups, providing the means for members of various ritually dominant local lineages to assert a certain sovereignty over other local lineages, while asserting ritual authority or suzerainty over more widespread areas. With the establishment of Rajput lineages over the area, these early, ritual forms with their accompanying myths increasingly lost their old content and took on new ones. This process could have either resulted from the influx of actual groups of "populous clans of warrior cultivators" (Bailey 1983:17) from India, which were involved in a "slow process of settlement [in northeast India] which set the main features of land-control in modern times from the borders of Awadh to Bengal" or else it could have resulted from further differentiation within already established lineage groups through influence from outside ideas or rituals; or it could have resulted from combination of both. The manner that this process took place in human history generally, its particular forms in citizenship and caste, and specific reference to Nepalese history are discussed below.

Subordination of Clan to Class in the Pristine City State

The precondition of the development of the first or pristine cities were these developments of production relations, the productive forces, the division of labor, property and the state, with its ideological and ritual counterments, that occurred in the development of the clan. Domestication of plants and animals, along with accompanying developments of the tools and conditions of production, led to increasing surpluses, the control of which meant the control of people. More directly, the control of land or herds meant control over the labor and products of people who worked the land or tended the herds. Due to previous developments described above, it was the

members of the lineages of ritual leaders who were positioned to control land, labor and products, leading to the full development of these lineages into separate, priestly ruling classes in these pristine cities. For the first time there occurred not just a division between lineages of non-specialists and ritual specialists, but a full-blown division of labor between those engaged in manual labor and those engaged solely in mental labor. This new division of labor first took the form of a division between the city and countryside, a division which has underlain and colored all subsequent divisions of labor.

Now that there was an actual divide within society, characterized by the full disenfranchisement and exploitation of a collection of laboring groups or classes, the services provided by the priests were elaborated into salvation religions. Since the people's suffering and difficulties were chronically related to the contradiction in the division of labor between those who labored and those who enjoyed the products of the labor, the priests unlike the ritual leaders before them, could no longer supply the workers' needs without overturning this division of labor, abolishing property and reducing their lineages back into a laboring class as well. In lieu of such an unlikely occurrence, in addition to communicating with supernatural powers and formulating sanctions, the priests had to formulate an ideology for the laboring groups explaining the suffering and inequality in this world and provide a hope for a better life or release after death (if the sanctions are obeyed).⁴ Thus some sort of functional correlate to dharma, karma, and reincarnation or nirvana is found in all of the great religions.

As these cities expanded in their population, wealth and influence, not only did the power accruing to these priesthoods increase, but the basis was being laid for the ascendancy of other social interests and the destruction of the monopoly of the priests. The conquest of neighboring cities and the creation of empires led to the rise of military groups and emergence of military leaders who directly controlled the material forces of subjugation. Generals soon became kings, sublimating the priests, who never reappeared with the monopolistic power that they had enjoyed in the early city states. Nevertheless, they continued in providing the ideological framework in which the rule of subsequent classes was sanctioned and legitimized; they also remained a prominent force in the state in administration; and furthermore, as a ruling class based on landownership and collection of rents, their interests and those of the military groups were one. The growth of cities and their expanding influence brought also a quickening of intercourse and trade, leading to the development of specialized commercial classes and a division between trade and industry, and further divisions within industry.

Where previously the expanding linkages of one lineage to another had been the means to multiply the human resources available to an individual,

under private property these became a liability. Linkages to other groups meant also the sharing of control over land and flocks, the dispersal of wealth, and the decentralization and equalization of power. Thus the rise of class society also brought the sublimation of the lineage to the patriarchal family. Among the ruling classes particularly, the rise of private property meant the disenfranchisement of women, since the cutting of the woman off from rights within her natal family was a means that the link between affinally related clans was broken, preventing the dispersal of power and wealth. The disempowerment of women was not necessary or natural, but probably there was a tendency towards it due to the prior militarization of men, for example.⁵ Other means to the same end were the strengthening of the power of the patriarch over his wife and sons, reducing them in essence to the status of slavery. Estate slavery found its origins in this slavery of the patriarchal family as, with the expansion of the territory of the cities through conquest, the cultivator was transformed into estate holder.

Even far distant from cities, the division of labor and property relations within segmentary states became much more pronounced in the course of the development of urban civilization. For example, the great expansion of the urban colonies of the Greeks and administrative cities of the Romans, led not only to the exploitation of segmentary states through exchange by urban traders, but to the opportunity for enlarged accumulation and aggrandizement by groups composing the segmentary states in the shadow of cities. The Scythians, Mongols, Germanic tribes, etc. are examples. Commonly it was from among these greatly transformed lineage organized groups on the periphery of decaying empires where the contradictions stymieing the development of old civilizations were transcended and innovative new urban forms arose. From the standpoint of the changes that have continually taken place among the lineage organized societies in the hinterlands of cities, the delineation of the segmentary state as a generic type becomes problematic.

Caste and Citizen: Expansion of Class in the Secondary Cities

The secondary civilizations arising from the Mesopotamian pristine cities took two essentially different forms, which were shaped by the developments of those cities, but differed from them. In the civilizations of Ancient Greece and Rome, these developments led to the divisions of the state into citizen and non-citizen, while in the upper Ganges River of the Indian subcontinent of the early Vedic period (2nd millennium B.C.), they led to divisions of people among the various Varnas and jats, i.e., caste. Both citizenship and caste developed according to principles (though different ones) inherent in the clan itself, while sublimating the clan. They were alternative forms which arose to address different conditions and needs arising as ruling classes

subordinated lineage organized societies to a division of labor based upon private property. As each developed, caste also transformed to satisfy new needs arising from changing class configurations with the development of production and society.

Mediterranean Citizenship

As discussed in Southall (1984 b, n.d.), the form of state that arose in the course of the development of the city states of the northern Mediterranean diverged significantly from that of the states that had preceded them. The city states of Ancient Greece, as well as Rome, were formed by the coming together of disparate groups of cultivators organized on the basis of lineage relations. All male members of these founding lineages were citizens, residents of the city. All citizens had an equal right to a vote within the general assembly which had developed from the assemblies of the collections of lineages ("phyla" or "tribes") which had come together in the city. Initially at least, citizens had a right to plots of land and thus were by definition landowners.

It was due to this enfranchisement in terms ownership that, though the Ancient community began with its seat in the city, it was associated with a territory which had to expand as the population reproduced itself and grew in numbers and wealth. Initially, this expansion took the form of emigration of citizens and establishment of colonies in other locations throughout the Mediterranean region. It ended with the Empires of Macedonia and Rome, in which the citizens became increasingly rural landlords set upon estates throughout the territory, leading Marx to speak of the career of Ancient society in terms of "ruralization of the city."

Even prior to the foundation of the Mediterranean cities, these lineages had been greatly modified due to the influences of urban empires to the east, as well as due to internal pressures arising through their own reproduction and development. Thus the principle of lineage equality had already been transformed in practice in the preceding segmentary states. The civic democracy that it evolved into with the coming together of the tribes into the city was in fact a means for a small wealthy landlord class to rule with the assistance of dependent clients who made up the great bulk of the members of the lineage groups. Inequality in property holdings increased, and the large property holders increasingly asserted themselves in this democracy. The clan institutions gave way to less democratic forms, eventually falling to the rule of emperors among the Romans. Women were disenfranchised (although this changed in late Rome); immigrants, freedmen and the less directly exploited peoples of segmentary states in the hinterlands were left unenfranchised; and conquered peoples were enslaved to provide labor on estates and in workshops

owned by the small group of wealthy and powerful citizens. We can see that citizenship, which had developed on the basis of the clan, served as the ideological category supporting the class rule of a very limited groups of people.

"The general freedom of thought and action, the balanced cultivation of body and mind, the passion for beauty in life and art have haunted Western man ever since. But at Athens even in its heyday these things were paradoxically only for a minority. Less than a sixth of the population were full citizens, another half were of free but non-citizen status, while over one third were slaves. Only citizens participated in Athenian democracy, which was thus a glorious facade" (Southall n.d., c. 3:10).

"In reality, however, -- granted that many poor citizens were supported in a degree of leisure by political attendance payments at councils and assemblies....., as well as by the free food which both they and destitute non-citizens could share, -- a minority group of the relatively wealthy and privileged citizens monopolized power and leisure, despising the disenfranchised merchants who generated most of the wealth, collectively oppressing and taxing the peasants who grew the food and standing on the necks of the slaves who did the menial jobs" (ibid: 20).

Caste in the Indian Subcontinent

In the Indian subcontinent, clans gave rise to caste, not the division of citizen versus non-citizen. Like citizenship, the ideological categories of caste were based on characteristics of clan categories. Unlike citizenship, caste evidently originated not from a coming together of tribes in an urban community and the transformation of their members into a citizenry defined in terms of the clan principle of equality. Rather, caste developed as a further elaboration of the ideology and ritual of the lineage inequality of the segmentary state, but with the same effect of assisting displacement of communal property with private property and transformation of the organization of labor in lineages into that of classes.

Marx (1972:183), in his notes on Morgan's *Ancient Society* (1877), in what the anthropologist Karl Krader (1972:15) calls "the most explicitly dialectical of all Marx's formulations ... in the Morgan notebook," hypothesized that caste arose from the ranking that developed among various groups of clans.⁶ As the ranking that developed between lineages in the segmentary state came to assure control over increasing labor and accumulation of its products, higher ranking lineages could no longer intermarry with lower ranking ones, since such intermarriage would lead to a dispersal of property. This led to what Marx identified as a conflict with the principle of clan exogamy, resulting in a "petrification" of exogamous clans

into endogamous castes. The clan increasingly existed only in abstract principles, while the concrete relations gave way to class relations clothed in the form of caste.

It is proposed that this process occurred among pastoral peoples living in the periphery of the early cities of West Asia. Breeding of domesticated livestock (particularly cattle), trade and other forms of intercourse with the growing cities provided a basis for the accumulation and differentiation of wealth, division of labor and product, and therein the full development of private property. Consequently, some form of caste ranking seems to have existed even at the time of Aryan entry into the Indian subcontinent, although it may have been closer to the sort of ranking found among the segmentary states. As this ranking became a means of subjugation of sedentary peoples it took on other characteristics presently associated with caste, depending upon the development of class interests therein.

This position is supported by existence of the four Varnas (Brahmana, Rajanya, Vaisya, and Shudra) in the early Vedas⁷ indicating ideological categories corresponding to the same main divisions that matured with the growth of cities: mental labor, military, commerce and physical labor, respectively. As in the cities, this differentiation started with a priesthood that fully differentiated out of the ritual leaders of the segmentary state. The other groups must have arisen more or less simultaneously with the creation of a separate priesthood, since the existence of such a priesthood would depend upon much greater productivity, trade, and accumulation of wealth. Militarization occurred in the face of military pressure from the cities; traders became increasingly prominent in the intercourse with the cities; and specializations within production arose with an increasingly complex aggregate of productive forces.

While caste represents and extends class interests, like citizenship, caste is neither class nor does its divisions correspond to class divisions. Class initially arises "in itself" as divisions of labor arise within production and commerce due to the exigencies and possibilities extending from growing productive forces. As consciousness arises among groups of people due to their position within the division of labor, class also comes to exist "for itself." Caste, on the other hand, has no necessary connection to production and thus does not exist "in it self". At one extreme, a Brahmin landlord may live side-by-side with a Brahman bonded laborer; or while he may be the king's purohit, his wife may be little more than an uneducated domestic laborer or courtesan.⁸ Like citizenship, caste mystifies class divisions and exists to further the interests of particular class groups.

The class divisions which underlay caste initially consisted of surplus taking classes based in landed property (landlords from priest and military

groups) and commercial capital (traders). Unlike in the Mediterranean civilization, where only slaves and non-citizens engaged in trade, commercial groups enjoyed partial enfranchisement as the lowest of the "touchable" Varnas, perhaps because the community did not begin with landed proprietors, as in the case of the Mediterranean city state. Commercial capital had developed as a specialized occupation within pastoralism prior to entry of Aryans into the subcontinent and their establishment as landed proprietors. Thus having already arisen as a social interest independent of landed property, commerce had to be given a place among the enfranchised castes. Yet, since commerce did not in general establish itself directly over producers, it continued to remain subordinated to landed property until after industrial capital entered the subcontinent in the 19th Century.

For the laborer, it was another story. Like in the Ancient city, both craft and agricultural laborers were disenfranchised socially, politically and ideologically according to descent. However, unlike the laborer in Mediterranean cities, the laborers in the caste system were not chattel slaves. They remained upon their land and in possession of it and their tools. Without the restriction of craft labor and commerce to slaves, there was no creation of an unemployed urban mass of freedmen and landless citizens. Thus in the Indian cities we do not see the rise of the institution of "bread and circuses," in which the municipality distributed hundreds of thousands of free loaves of bread and built great coliseums to keep the restive unemployed rabble fed and entertained. This significant difference between the community under the regime of South Asian caste as opposed to Mediterranean citizenship is a result of the differences in the manner of expansion of private property in the two forms.

The driving forces behind the development and elaboration of a society characterized by an ideology of caste rather than citizenship were the exigencies of a dispersed pastoral people, already transformed from a lineage-based or segmentary to class society, expanding into the South Asian subcontinent among people still organized according to segmentary states ("tribes"). Their premise was not an established city with a territory divided up among citizen cultivators as private property, which they expanded by conquest and cultivated with the labor of conquered peoples whom they had uprooted as slaves.

The Aryan groups rather took as their premise, on the one hand, their own developed productive forces and social organization organized around private property in herds and, subsequently, land. They premised themselves also in the intercourse and commerce with urban civilizations of west Asia, which had further augmented the productive forces and transformed the social organization of the segmentary state. And they took as their premise the

existing organization of segmentary states that they subjugated, with their already emerging social differentiation and accompanying ideology and ritual. Given these premises, the invading Aryan groups established themselves as landlords by inverting the clan principle into a caste one, and setting their already well established division of labor, with its caste divisions of priest, soldier and merchant, over the lineages of the segmentary states, transforming the members of these into a laboring class. The lineages of the previous segmentary state were themselves increasingly divided among themselves according to the same caste principle, while their ritual leaders were co-opted into the upper castes. Simultaneously, the Aryan groups also introduced more developed productive forces, including irrigation, plow agriculture, metal working and so forth, thereby backing and augmenting ideological and ritual means of control with increasing material powers, providing the basis for military expansion into empires. In a society where control of water and cattle provided the means to augment and control human labor power, both were given a sacred character.⁹

While the cultivator groups were disenfranchised both economically and politically, they were subject within their communities according to the principles of the pre-existing organization. The caste principle fully developed the ritual subordination of the lineage groups of the segmentary state into a subordination of agricultural and craft labor to landlords. Distribution of the means of subsistence to all groups was framed legally in terms of shares of agricultural product. While ownership of landed property became alienated from the agricultural and industrial producers, these producers remained in possession of their land and tools. Thus there was not the creation of a propertyless proletariat.

Like in the assembly of the Mediterranean cities, the democracy of the clan persisted in the community level Panchayat councils, but the franchise was restricted to the Brahman priesthood. And these in turn were dominated by the wealthiest among them. At the state level, this democracy persisted in the council of advisers to the king, the Raj Subba, but again limited not just to one caste, but to the predominant families of the nobility within it.

The process of expansion of these landed classes in Nepal can be clearly seen in the subjection of the segmentary political organization identified for pre-Rajput Nepal to a landed property class. The expansion of landed property into Nepal was associated with the movement of "populous clans of warrior cultivators" from north India, where they were involved in the same "slow process of settlement which set the main feature of land-control in modern times from the borders of Awadh to Bengal" (Bayly 1983:17). These warrior cultivators, referring to descent from Rajput lineages as a means to establish their legitimacy, set themselves over the hill people and their lineage

organized polities, initially subjecting them through their existing lineage hierarchies. The warrior cultivators subsequently established sovereignty through introduction of Brahmanic ideology and ritual and set up leading families as kings to represent their interests. They pushed the villagers from the more fertile rent producing bottom lands up onto dry hillsides, where, unable to sustain and reproduce themselves as autonomous communities, they provided a bonded labor force to the new landlord class.¹⁰

This private property form, in combination with the introduction of productive forces such as the plow, irrigation, oxen, other domesticated plants and animals and associated forms of knowledge, provided the basis for agglomeration of wealth and power, eventually enabling one of these Rajputs, King Prithivi Narayan Shah, to launch in the mid-18th century the war of conquest which resulted in the full "unification" of the present nation state by the end of the first decade of the 19th.

The Kirat areas to the east of the Kathmandu Valley, which had not been subjected by the Rajputs, were still organized as segmentary states with land remaining under communal tenure. Thus while the Kirat areas provided no match militarily, due to lack of concentration of power, subsequently they have been the most difficult to bring under the regime of private tenure; inversely, while the states to the west were conquered militarily only with great difficulty, their lands were relatively easily reallocated among landlord interests represented by the state, since these lands had already been subjected to the private tenure of such classes. Indeed, it was the desperate economic condition of the villagers in these same previously subjected areas and their ties of patronage to landlords which allowed Prithivi Narayan Shah and his successors to mobilize them with promises of land and security.¹¹

For villagers subjected in terms of landed property relations, the promise of land ownership seemed like liberation. However, these plots were encumbered with the property class which constituted the state and the cultivators never emerged as an independent peasantry.¹² Like citizenship and democracy in Mediterranean city states, caste and its assemblies and councils were "a glorious facade."

Notes

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Program. However, the conclusion, opinions and other statements in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Councils, U.S.E.F. or the Wenner-Gren Foundation.

2. Thus he goes against the positions that advocate an undifferentiated primitive communism prior to the rise of the city and civil society, such as of Marx (1973) and Engels (1983). He further develops his criticism of the "tribe" and other anthropological formulations of supposedly "stateless" societies.
3. A contemporary news story in *Rising Nepal* refers to an incident about the descendents of such ritual leaders, called here a "rain maker" (Kahl 1991: 4): "A dispute over a buffalo has had far reaching consequences for the people of Karungu, a village on the shores of Lake Victoria. Their troubles began one year ago when an old man accused the grandson of a local rainmaker of stealing the animal. Word of the alleged theft quickly spread and the accused, George Owuor, went to the village headman to complain of what he saw as a blemish on his character." If I am really a grandson of the rainmaker, Mzee Minot, there shall be no rain here in the next seven years, no harvest and the people shall experience serious hunger during these days, the angry young man vowed.

"Local belief has it that rainmakers are able to do more than move the heavens to open. If they are angry they can also bring on a drought. At first, nobody in Karungu took George seriously. It was only this spring when the time came to sow the fields that they remembered his curse. The rains, which had always fallen at the time the crops were being sown, failed to materialise this year. Alarmed, the village elders demanded to see George. He was not in the village so they questioned his widowed mother instead.

"Three times Mrs Dorsila Jongo Ogola was called to appear before the village council and each time she was quizzed about why she had brought on the drought. The woman admitted she was the daughter of a now deceased rainmaker, but said the power to make rain or cause droughts could only be handed down to boys, not to girls. This explanation failed to appease the elders, who argued that other villages in the region had had plenty of rain during crop-planting. Only Karungu and its immediate vicinity were left dry, with the result that drinking water was in short supply and crops and other vegetation were damaged.

"Some villagers pointed out that Dorsila had not bothered to till her

own fields knowing full well that no rain was going to fall. People began to ignore her. Some even demanded she be punished. When George returned he went to the elders to complain of the treatment to which his mother had been subjected. There ensued a lengthy discussion which ended with George apologising for his curse and shaking hands with each member of the village council. That same night a hefty rain shower fell on the village, according to a report in the Kenya Times. The allegations against the widow and her son were dropped. dpa"

4. See Max Weber's, (1978:490-2) discussion in the section, "The Differential Function of Salvation Religion for Higher and Lower Strata: Legitimization versus Compensation", in his *Sociology of Religion*.
5. Thus women revolutionaries, such as those in the Sandinista army, have found that to continue to maintain their power in society after a successful armed revolutionary struggle, the women's divisions in the army cannot be disbanded.
6. "The Kutchin (Louchoux) of the Yukon river Region [Northwest Territories, British North America, southerly from the ex-Russian coastal lowlands] are Athapascans and with them (according to the letter of the late George Gibbs to Morgan): among the Kutchin "3 grades or classes of society (should call totem, which however may be dissimilar in rank [& in the manner namely how had come to the dominance of the gens principle, could by & by the gens to give way to the caste-formation? Where then the prohibition of intermarriage between different gentes completely inverted the archaic rule of the intermarriage within the same gens;]; a man does not marry into his own class, but takes a wife from some other; and that a chief from the highest may marry with a woman of the lowest without loss of caste. [The concept of caste carries the letter writer further & he interprets such that a man cannot marry into his own gens, probably rather into the gens of his other brother-or cousin phratry; this shows but that as soon as a difference of rank between blood relations of the gentes arises, this comes into conflict with the apparatus (geräth) of the gentile principle & the gens in its contrary, caste, can petrify] The children belong to the grade of the mother [Which thus the rank distinction between gentes, brothers and sisters of all resign themselves in gentes of each rank. The kindred ranks let no complete aristocracy to arise, fraternity remains in the sentiment of equality] The members of the same grade in different tribes do not war with

each other" (Marx 1983: 183; emphasis added on his own interpretation).

7. "The quadruple division of society is mentioned in some of the earlier [Vedic] hymns, but it makes its formal appearance in the *Purushasukta* which seeks to explain the existing divisions by adumbrating the theory that 'when they divided the primeval being (*Purusa*) the *Brahmana* was his mouth, the *Rajanya* became his arms, the *Vaisya* was his thighs, and from his feet sprang the *Sudras*'" [Majumdar et al.: 31].
8. According to my samples of gender taking SLC in Bandipur, the proportion of Brahman men to women (78%:12%) is no different than other village groups, despite the Brahman position as landlords. This demonstrates a linkage between property, its ideology, and the disenfranchisement of women, discussed in the previous sections (Mikesell 1988: 213).
9. The sacred character of the cow was subjected to a debate started by Marvin Harris in U.S. anthropological journals in the late 1960s and early 70s around the question of functionalist rationality versus economic irrationality. However, among a herding people, domesticated cattle were property par excellence, and in cultivation, along with prepared land and irrigation, the means of production of surpluses. Thus the cow's sacred character was the means to control the distribution of this surplus within society; as such, it is no more irrational than the sanctions given to capital today, in which all forms of labor power have been subjected to the logic of private property in the form of the exchange relation, and in which the lives of millions of people are sacrificed to preserve and expand the division of labor and accumulation of surplus represented within it.
10. Available histories of course describe the process of the establishment of private property merely in terms of the conquest of tribal lands by Rajput kings who replace earlier "chiefs" or kings without providing any indication of the transformation of the property or associated political forms. However, a good idea of the process as I have described it can be obtained from the experience of the Kirat cultivators of Eastern Nepal (Limbu, Rai), who were only conquered two centuries ago and whose communal forms of tenure are still undergoing a process of transformation, and where the present State was forced to recognize these forms of property and associated interests even as it set about to destroy them.

11. Prithivi Narayan Shah was quite aware of this, as quoted in his deathbed advice to his heirs in 1775 (Stiller 1968). Thus it is the hill peoples of the western hill kingdoms of Nepal, and not the people of the eastern communally based states, who are described as the "martial races" and who subsequently were recruited by the British army.
12. The miserable condition of these people is described in Ludwing F. Stiller (1976).

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NEPAL AND SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY

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Nepal's important place in South Asian regional security stems from her geostrategic position. She lies not only in the crossroads of two powerful civilizations, but also in the heart of the Himalayas, the formidable mountain range separating the Indo-subcontinent from the Tibeto-Chinese region. Although India is about two-thousand miles long, the Himalayas and the Tibetan plateau are the controlling features of the physical and political geography of the subcontinent.¹ It is Nepal that occupies the central position in the Himalayas and controls one-third of the mountain chain. According to one source, the name Nepal is derived from the word Ne, which means the centre.² Her spatial element has been the key element in determining her role in South and East Asia.

Her geostrategic significance arises from two factors. First, from political perspective, Nepal's position linking the two land masses of India and China has given to her a unique buffer status enjoyed by few countries in the world.³ Second, from a commercial perspective, her control of the two vital passes Kuti (Nyilam) and Kerong (Kyirong) in the central Himalayas enabled Nepal to monopolize the trans-Himalayan trade from the ancient period to the turn of this century. The role of political and commercial buffer Nepal fulfilled through ages made Kathmandu the entrepot for all goods and ideas that flowed between South and East Asia.

The opening of the Phari route via Kalimpong, India, by the British towards the close of the nineteenth century led to an eclipse of Nepal's monopoly of Trans-Himalayan trade. Her economic premiership in the Trans-Himalayan trade was never regained, yet, the emergence of two powerful states with divergent political systems on opposite sides of the Himalayan region made Nepal alive and sensitive in the post-1950 decades.⁴ In these decades the two super powers, as well as Nepal's immediate neighbors, India

and China, were competing for their sphere of influence in the Himalayan belt, particularly Nepal. This is seen in the rapid increase in the numbers of aid donors and amounts of aid entering Nepal.⁵

There is neither a unified security policy in South Asia nor a shared perception of a common threat to bid the countries of the region together in the manner of the ASEAN and the NATO countries. In fact, there are fundamental cleavages in political and security perceptions of South Asian countries reflecting rather a deep sense of insecurity. The past history, moulded by the wounds of partition, the dominance of India and the disparity between India and her neighbors in size, population and GDP, has clouded the need for evolution of security pattern and regional cooperation. There is thus no "strategic consensus" or even a sense of belonging to the security community in the South Asian region. It is only India that feels that the Himalayan region and the sunshine island of Sri Lanka are an integral part of her defence system.

The exit of the British from the subcontinent led India to try to build a security community of the Himalayan neighbors, in which she formulated the southern Himalayan policy network that brought Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim within her security umbrella. Though India inherited a full-fledged secretariat from the British, the ministry of external affairs was born only in the summer of 1947. As the ministry was new and the bureaucracy inexperienced, the definition of foreign policy towards the three "border states" -- Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan -- was a difficult problem for independent India. Many high ranking Indian officials, such as the deputy premier Sardar V. Patel urged the annexation of the border states in the Himalayas in the manner of the "native states".⁶ However, Premier Nehru, who headed the ministry of external affairs, was against such an idea.

Though accession of the "border states" in the central Himalayas was impractical, India never the less maintained a special interest in the Himalayan region by labeling it a sensitive area. India, thus, concluded separate bilateral treaties with each of the Himalayan states. Sikkim's autonomy was very much limited both externally and internally. Bhutan's internal autonomy was recognized, but India retained the right to "advise her" on external affairs. Nepal, which possessed five hundred miles of contiguous territory with the heartland of India -- United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh), Bihar and Bengal -- drew special attention from India. She concluded the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Nepal on July 31, 1950.⁷

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship was hastily signed by India and Nepal at Kathmandu during the hot summer of 1950. Two factors were instrumental in paving the way for Rana Nepal and the independent India to formulate this treaty at this juncture: the clear emergence of the Chinese sovereignty in

Tibet and the increasing probability of "an armed revolution" in Nepal. After the conclusion of the treaty, Premier Mohan had strong reasons to feel that the favor of Pandit Nehru was on his side. For Premier Nehru, Nepal had to be brought within the India security system at all cost. By his astute diplomacy, Nehru took "time by the forelock" and carefully guided the course of events in the Himalayas. He clearly saw that the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was a foregone conclusion. So the communist infiltration south of the Himalayas had to be prevented. Again, any violent upheaval in Nepal like an "armed revolution" that could promote anarchy had to be prevented. He sincerely believed that any radical departure from the past by Nepal would not only give rise to chaos and confusion in Nepal but also pave the way for a communist takeover. Nehru, thus, decided to crib and curb the wings of the Nepali "revolution". Premier Mohan could derive little comfort from this reasoning, for the days of Rana oligarchy in Nepal in the new scheme of things devised by India were sealed.

India's security perception of South Asia was the overriding factor that promoted India to control the developments south of the Himalayas. On November 31, 1949 Peking Radio gave the orders to "liberate the whole of Tibet."⁸ When New Delhi protested, China quickly asserted that Tibet was an integral part of China and foreign interference would not be tolerated. The speech delivered by Premier Nehru before the Indian parliament on December 5, 1950 clarifies the policy of the Government of India during these turbulent times. This important speech in part ran:

We are interested in our country's security and our own country's border. We have had from the time immemorial a magnificent frontier—the Himalayas We are not going to tolerate any person coming over that barrier. Therefore much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal; we cannot risk our own security by anything not done in Nepal which permits that barrier to be crossed, or otherwise leads to the weakening of that frontier.⁹

In other words, Pandit Nehru felt that the Nepali Himalayas was a common defence line, whose protection was the duty of both India and Nepal.

It was with the above background that the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed between India and Nepal in the summer of 1950. The Indo-Nepal treaty shows signs of haste. The final draft of the treaty had nine clauses. Article Nine states, "the treaty shall be in force for a period of ten years ... unless terminated by either party by giving a notice of not less than one year in writing, continue to be in force for another ten years."¹⁰ But the final draft was amended during the last moment to include ten articles. Article Nine of

the draft became the Article Ten of the treaty, which ran "the treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year notice."¹¹

Here we can visualize what was going on in the mind of the Indian leadership. Among the two treaties signed on July 31, 1950, the Treaty of Trade and Commerce between the Government of Nepal and the Government of India was limited for a period of ten years; in contrast, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nepal and India was to be of a more permanent character and was to last for an indefinite period. India was indeed right in her contemplation. Even during 1989-1990 when Nepal-India relations reached a state of an all time low the Nepal Government could not give the one year notice necessary for the termination of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950; she rather asked only for the removal of the distortions of the treaty.

The principal clause of the treaty that brings Nepal within the parameter of the Indian security system is Article 2, which makes it obligatory on part of both the governments "to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach of the friendly relations existing between two governments."

The two treaties were not all Nepal received from India on the eve of July 31, 1950. She was also the recipient of the "Letters of Exchange", which was kept under tight secrecy for almost a decade. But since its release in 1959, it has been increasingly looked upon as representing India's domination of South Asia. The "Letters of Exchange" is a novel feature of India's diplomacy. These contain far more important provisions than the treaty itself. They were not included in the treaty and kept in tight secrecy because India did not want to come under public controversy. India possibly felt that the "Letters of Exchange" could be interpreted as "penalty clauses" imposed by a big power over a small one.

The same psychology was prevalent among the Indian leadership during the signing of the of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement at Colombo on July 29, 1987. Here also, as in the case of Nepal, letters were exchanged between the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President Mr. J. R. Jayewardene. These letters brought Sri Lanka within the Indian security system. India on this occasion again desired these "Letters of Exchange" be kept a secret. But the president of Sri Lanka declined and insisted that they must be known to all. To quote the president, "I said no. They should be made public."¹³

Some of the important security oriented provisions in the "Letters of Exchange" between Nepal and India were as follows.

Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat the two governments shall consult each other and devise effective counter measure.

Any arms and ammunition or warlike materials and equipments necessary for the security of Nepal that the Government of Nepal may import through the territory of India shall also be imported with *the assistance and agreement* of the Government of India. (emphasis in the original).

Both the Governments agreed not to employ any foreigners whose activities may be prejudicial to the security of the other...¹⁴

In doing so the leaders of independent India were trying to insulate South Asia from the Chinese communist influence. Looking across the Himalaya with western spectacles, they were only stepping into the Anglo-American shoes with their China-phobia. The Government of India felt that the "Letters of Exchange", attached to the annexes of the treaty were as valid as the treaty itself and that they served as important tools of Indian diplomacy.

Again, the *aide memoire* handed to D. R. Regmi by the Government of India at the conclusion of the talks in July 1958 summarized the views of the Government of India since 1950. The *aide memoire* had seven clauses pertaining to the security of both the countries. Among them clauses three and four are the most important.

The government of Nepal will likewise consult the Government of India regards to any matters relating to foreign policy or relations with foreign powers, with the view to coordinate policy, in particular in matters relating to the relations with Tibet and China, consultations will take place with the Government of India.¹⁵

Then came the Agreement between India and Nepal of January 30, 1965 in which Nepal gave India the monopoly of fulfilling all her military needs, including the training of her personnel. In return India also withdrew its support to the Nepali Congress and the Nepali Communists, who were living in exile in India. The details of this Agreement were kept a secret up to April 1989 when the Indian newspapers disclosed the important text of the Agreement.

Thus, the evolution on Nepal's joint security perception with India took place in three steps: The Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India of 1950, including the "Exchange of Letters" that were attached with the treaty of

1950, the *aide memoire* of 1958, and the Agreement of January 1965. All these steps were carefully designed to insulate the Chinese influence from south of the Himalayas.

However, in the subsequent years this miniature security system so neatly and carefully devised by the leaders of India suffered a major setback when Nepal, inspite of the Treaty of 1950, evolved its own security perspective on its border contiguous with China (Tibet). To the surprise and even dismay of the Indian leaders, Nepal not only followed "a China Policy" in the late 1950s but also cultivated diplomatic relationship with as many countries as possible.

Today, Sikkim has formally become a state in the Indian Union, and Bhutan is the only country in the Himalayas that is formally and practically tied with the Indian security system. However, in 1979 even the King of Bhutan openly came out and asked for the revision of the treaty with India.

It is true that Nepal still retains the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India, yet it has been able to diversify its foreign policy to such an extent that it has developed its own security perspective vis-a-vis China. Thus, her treaty with India of 1950 remains more in letter than in spirit. Nepal's claim to be recognized as a zone of peace since 1975 further helped in the erosion of the original spirit of the treaty. As a small state, Nepal has no ambition to play a grandiose role in regional and world politics. It cannot risk its independence by becoming a part of the larger South Asian polity; or to put it in different perspective, Nepal has no desire to follow the Sikkim model. The reality that India and China are the real guarantors of Nepal's security cannot be wishfully washed away. Nepal, thus, must remain unaligned from either of her two neighbours, despite her extensive relations with India on the social, economic, cultural, and political levels.

As the decade of 1950s came to a close, Nepal slowly began to pull out herself from the Indian security system. Refusing to accept the status of a political buffer for the Indian security system, King Birendra went to the extent of saying, "Nepal is not a part of the subcontinent. It is really a part of Asia that touches both India and China."¹⁶ Again, in a demand for the withdrawal of the Indian military mission from Kathmandu, the Nepali prime-minister Kirtinidhi Bista summed up the Nepali position with the words "Nepal could not compromise its sovereignty for India's so-called security."¹⁷

There are fundamental differences in political and security perceptions in South Asia, reflecting a deep sense of insecurity. The fear of Indian dominance is a major phenomenon in South Asian politics. The deep wounds of partition which created three independent states -- India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh-- out of what was once known as British India proper, has created a cloud of distrust and misunderstanding, which even "Time", the best

physician, has proved to be a poor healer. This mistrust has in fact climbed to greater-heights than reality justifies.

Nepal-India relations experienced a similar trend. In 1961 Nepal and China agreed to construct a 104 km. road linking Kathmandu with Kodari (Nepal-Tibeto-China border) without paying any attention to the strong Indian criticism that the Himalayas was a natural security frontier of India and Nepal. This road was completed in 1967 and became a plus factor in China's strategic consideration vis-a-vis India. This geostrategic change remains unacceptable in the minds of Indian policy makers, Nepali statesmen have always rejected the existence of any threat.

In the early 1960s, Indo-Nepal relations reached such a crisis stage that the Chinese foreign minister had to come to Nepal's rescue. To quote the Chinese Minister, "in case any foreign army makes a foolhardy attempt to attack Nepal, China will side the Nepalese people."¹⁸ Thus, the Treaty of 1950 between India and Nepal took a sharp about-turn. For the first time China came out openly against India on the behalf of Nepal. Nepal played the China card to her advantage with considerable dexterity in the early years of 1960s.

Nepal's political reliance on China was altered by the Bangladesh liberation movement in 1971.¹⁹ Nepal power-elites began to sense a rapidly changing political map of South Asia in which India was to emerge as the dominant power. India's bold determination to create Bangladesh, inspite of China's support of Pakistan, compelled Nepal to change her policy towards East Pakistan. As events dramatically unfolded the breakup of Pakistan became inevitable. The appearance of a new neighbor so close to her eastern border compelled Nepal to change her position. Thus, in an unexpected move, Nepal did not join the United Nation's call on India for an immediate ceasefire on the Indo-Pakistan border. Nepal's permanent representative to the United Nations explained her last hour shift in her policy this way: as his country was surrounded by big and powerful neighbors it was "incapable of defending itself alone from external attacks or imposing her will on others by means of the use of threat of force."²⁰ To Nepal a close neighbor like Bangladesh was more important politically and economically than the distant Pakistan. It was her own security perceptions and economic well-being that compelled Nepal to change her earlier stand in the Bangladesh movement.

Nepal-India relations again reached a crisis stage between 1989-1990. Out of 19 entry points between Nepal and India, India closed all except two: one at Jogbani and the other at Raxaul. India charged Nepal for violating the Treaty of 1950. India's anger had been instigated by Nepal's purchase of arms from China by work-permits issued by Nepal to Indian workers, and by questions relating to the overall treatment of Indians in Nepal. For real as

well as psychological reasons India perceived the measures taken by Nepal as a threat to her security.

It is therefore quite clear that Nepal looks at certain foreign policy issues differently from India, whether it may be the Chinese threat across the Himalayas, or the Afghanistan or the Cambodian issue. These differences have often clouded Nepal-India relations from time-to-time. But a small country can hardly ignore the security perception of a large and powerful neighbor whether whatever continent it may be in. If a small nation does not follow a policy of "self restraint" and "reassurance" towards a big and a powerful neighbor, then it is only natural that the latter should use its sinews to bring pressures on the former to change its direction.

It is tempting for a political analysts to compare Nepal's position in recent experience with that of Finland. One would even use the expression "Finlandisation" of Nepal by India. According to Alvin Rubinstein "Finlandisation" is "commonly used to signify a process whereby the former Soviet Union influenced the domestic and foreign policy behavior of a non-communist countries so that they voluntarily follow policies congenial or approved by the Soviet Union."²¹ As a political metaphore, the term is often used to describe the efforts of a powerful country to carve out its sphere of influence among small ones.

There are indeed some parallels between Nepal and Finland. With the outbreak of World War II, the former Soviet Union became increasingly alarmed at the possibility of a German invasion of the Soviet Union through Finland. The Soviet Union charged Finland with anti-Soviet preparations, providing an excuse to invade Finland in November 1939. This war proved to be catastrophic for Finland for she was compelled to surrender 12% of her territory to the Soviet Union, which remains occupied.²² Nepal similarly came into conflict with British India during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and in the subsequent war Nepal lost one-third of her territory of which India still retains almost all. After the War, Nepal continued to serve the Indian interest by helping her with men, material, and resources. The policy of independent India followed very much the same line as that of imperial India, especially with regards to the policy of recruitment and security perceptions. With the emergence of Communist China north of the Himalayas, Nepal figures more prominently in India's security perceptions than ever before.

After World War II, Finland and the Soviet Union signed a treaty. With a treaty signed between Finland and the Soviet Union following World War II, close ties with the Soviet Union became the cornerstone of Finnish foreign policy. After the Communist takeover of Tibet, India and Nepal also signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950. This initiated the development of a

special political relationship between India and Nepal.

The parallels between Finland and Nepal, however, merely indicate broad parameters of certain realities in the relationship of big power and a small country. The analogy of Finland is relevant to Nepal only to the extent of emphasizing the need to follow a policy of "self-restraint and reassurance" towards a big and powerful neighbor. In fact the position of Nepal is much more precarious and vulnerable than that of Finland. Unlike Finland, Nepal is not only landlocked or even "India-locked," but also one of the least developed countries in the world.

The price paid by a small country for good neighborliness and regional peace often consists of formulating its security perceptions along the line of its powerful neighbor. Today we are living not only in an age of superpowers but also of regional powers like India in South Asia. In the Western hemisphere, small states like Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cuba, Grenada and even larger polities like Canada and Mexico have learned to adjust according to the security interests of the United States. The U.S. feels that her security is jeopardized whenever a leftist government comes into power (Chile, Grenada) or when Soviet arms cross the Atlantic (Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama). Likewise the countries of Eastern Europe (Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary) could hardly ignore the Soviet interest in their foreign and domestic policy. In West Asia the Arabs have been painfully made aware of Israel's security perceptions. Likewise, in South Asia smaller polities like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives have little choice but to adjust according to the security perceptions of a powerful neighbor like India. Otherwise, much hardship and misery await such countries as manifested by the Nepali and Sri Lankan experience.

Notes

1. D. R. Regmi, *Nepal* (Banaras: Nepal National Congress, n.d.), p. 1.
2. For more on the physical features of the subcontinent in historical perspective, see Halford J. Mackinder, "The Subcontinent of India" in *Cambridge History of India* (ed.), E.J. Rapson, Vol. I, *Ancient India* (Delhi: S. Chad & Co., 1962), pp. 1-32.
3. For a detailed account on Nepal's buffer status, see "Stray Speeches and Impressions," by Kasher Bahadur K.C., *Civil Service Journal of Nepal*, Jan.-April, 1965, pp. 6-7.
4. Prem R. Uprety, *Nepal-Tibet Relations, 1850-1930; Years of Hopes Challenges and Frustrations* (Kathmandu: Puga Nara, 1980), pp. 23-33.

5. Ramakant, *Indo-Nepalese Relations, 1816-1887* (New Delhi: S. Chad & Co., 1968) pp. v-vii.
6. The Imperial Gazetters of India in 1881 places Nepal outside the pale of native states. To quote, "Nepal as an independent territory is beyond the scope of this book but some account can be expected in the Imperial Gazetters of India. See W. H. Hunter, *The Imperial Gazetters of India*, Vol. IV (Administrative) (London: Tuber & Co. 1881) p. 103.
7. See *Poka* entitled *treaties* in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu.
8. *Amrit bazar Patrika*, December 29, 1949.
9. For the speech of the Indian Premier see *Parliamentary Debates* Vol. VI, No. 17, Cols. 1285-86.
10. for the text and the final draft of the treaty see the *Poka* entitled *Treaties*, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu.
11. *Ibid.*
12. For the text of the Commercial Treaty, see the *Poka* entitled *Treaties*.
13. *The Sunday Observer*, August 16, 1987.
14. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcast, 1961), p. 374.
15. *Jhyali*, July 8, 1958, p. 2.
16. Chitra K. Tiwari, "Indian Northern Security and the Himalayan States," *Asian Profile*, vol. 14 (No. 5), August 1986. P. 448
17. *Ibid.* 444.
18. See *National China News Agency* October 6, 1962.
19. Anthony Mascaren has, *The Rape of Bangladesh* (Delhi: Vikash Publications, 1971; also Seikh Mujibur Rahaman, *Bangladesh My Bangladesh*, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972.
20. *Rising Nepal*, October 8, 1971, p. 1.
21. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global* (New York: Little Brown & Co, 1985), p. 112.
22. Max Jacobson, "Substance and Appearance: Finland", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 18, No. 5, p. 1038.

A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR OF NEPAL'S MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

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Introduction

Nepal has now entered its fourth decade of 'planned development' begun in 1956 with the launching of its 'First Plan' which, like all subsequent 'Plans', it should be noted, was contingent on foreign aid. One particular consequence of Nepal's dependence on foreign aid for its industrial development is that machine-based manufacturing, at least up to the latter half of the 1970s, has tended to be the preserve of the government. This is true even in those fields of manufacturing usually associated with the private rather than the public sector of production, leather footwear, for example.¹

The insignificant role played by private capital in Nepal's industrial development up to the mid 1970s, such as it was, is outlined by Stiller and Yadav (1979: 152-55) and in detail for the Central-West region of Nepal by Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon (1980: 188-212). Scholars have had little to say for the subsequent period, the decade covering the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. Yet, recently published information from the Department of Industry in Nepal suggests that private capital's level of participation may have reached a turning point in this period. The Department of Industry's publication reveals that all 79 'Medium' size manufacturing enterprises operating during 1980-1983, as well as 24 of the 36 'Large' ones established in this same period, were registered as 'Private, Ltd.' companies (1984: 189). Given that 'Medium' officially refers to an enterprise with an investment between Rs. 2 and 10 million in fixed assets (principally, machinery) and 'Large' refers to one with fixed assets in excess of Rs. 10 million, then it might be tentatively claimed that private capital's participation in the 1980s may be much more intensive than in the past.

Apart from the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the private sector

in Nepal's current manufacturing industry, there is also a great deal of uncertainty about the way this sector is constituted, since very little information is available in the current literature. No information on its social composition in the 1980s comes to my attention. There is no published information about the owners of the enterprises, themselves. It is the general aim of this paper to outline in fairly broad terms some of the major components of the private sector as it was constituted in 1985.

The data upon which this paper is based were extracted from the 'licence' and 'registration' records held at the Department of Industry in November, 1985. Needless to say, this data need to be supplemented by data that can only be obtained from the personnel of the various enterprises involved, a task planned as part of the second stage of the research project. Nevertheless, it seems advisable to try to publish the results of this first stage of the inquiry in order to disseminate the information gathered, since there is so little available, on the subject in the literature dealing with the current situation of industrialisation in Nepal, as far as manufacturing is concerned.

In presenting the results of the present inquiry, the emphasis is on description and not possible theoretical issues raised implicitly or explicitly by the data. Such issues may be more appropriately addressed once the second stage of the inquiry has been completed.

MAIN RESULTS

1. The Magnitude of the Private Sector

The records at the Department of Industry reveal that in November 1985 there were 544 operating industrial enterprises in Nepal, each with fixed assets in excess of Rs. 200,000. Another 204 had applied for licenses, but these were not as yet registered as operating enterprises. Applying the criteria used by the Department of Industry and endorsed by the Industrial Enterprises Act, 1981, the 544 industrial concerns operating in 1985 were classified in terms of size 'small'¹, 'medium', or 'large' – and in terms of whether they were government owned ventures (public sector) or privately owned (private sector). The resulting pattern is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Size of Enterprise

Sector	Small (n=304)	Medium (n=196)	Large (n=42)	Total (n=542) ²
Private	99.3	94.9	64.3	95.1
Public	0.7	5.1	35.7	4.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

On the basis of this pattern of results, there can be little doubt that in 1985, the magnitude of the private sector's participation in industrial manufacturing outstripped that of the public sector. Since the public sector previously tended to dwarf the private sector, the changes in that relationship must be a fairly recent phenomenon - Table 2 reveals exactly how recently.

Table 2: Size of Enterprise in the Private Sector

Period when enterprise was registered	Small (n=302) %	Medium (n=186) %	Large (n=27) %	Total (n=515) %
Before 1975	42.7	22.6	11.1	33.8
1975 - 1980	35.1	16.1	22.2	27.7
1980 - 1985	22.2	61.3	66.7	38.5
Total	100.00	100.0	100.0	100.0

It can be readily discerned from Table 2 that two-thirds of the private enterprises were registered during the period 1975-85 and, more tellingly, that a very high proportion of 'Medium' (61.3%) and an even higher proportion of the 'large' (66.7%) enterprises were registered between 1980 and 1985. Therefore, not only is private capital's level of participation now significantly higher than it has ever been in the past, but also, its entry at this relatively high level of investment has occurred most dramatically during the 1980s. But in which particular fields of production are the enterprises of this sector engaged?

2. Main Fields of Production

The records reveal that there 127 different commodities were being produced by the manufacturing public sector during 1985. For the purpose of cross tabulation, these have been classified into seven broad categories of commodity production:

- | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. 'food and drink' | 2. 'garment' |
| 3. 'building construction' | 4. 'household durables' |
| 5. 'health' | 6. 'education' |
| 7. 'miscellaneous' | |

The proportions of each of the different size enterprises engaged in these seven fields of production are given in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Size of Enterprise

Field of Production	'Small' (n=302) %	'Medium' (n=186) %	'Large' (n=27) %	Total (n=515) %
Food and drink	37.8	29.6	22.3	34.0
Garment	16.2	30.1	29.6	21.9
Building construction	19.5	22.6	33.3	21.3
Household durables	5.0	3.2	3.7	4.3
Health	5.6	4.8	0.0	5.0
Education	3.0	2.2	3.7	2.7
Miscellaneous	10.6	5.9	7.4	8.7
No. Information	2.3	1.6	0.0	2.1
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

It appears that just over three-quarters (77.2%) of the enterprises were engaged in producing commodities falling into one or other of three categories 'food and drink', 'garment,' and commodities used in 'building construction'. Moreover, 82.2% of the 'large' enterprises and 82.3% of the 'medium' were operating in these three fields of production. Of the 'large' enterprises, one-third were engaged in producing commodities aimed at the 'building construction' market; the highest proportion (30.1%) of the 'medium' size concerns were engaged in garment manufacturing; and the highest proportion (37.8%) of the 'small' businesses was producing for the 'food and drink' market.

Assuming that entrepreneurs respond to market demands or to the particular opportunities that these demands proffer, the burgeoning of the tourist industry and the internal migration of populations from the rural to the urban centers such as Kathmandu since the mid-1970s are important factors propelling private investment into the production of commodities for the 'food and drink', 'garment', and 'building construction' markets. However, in the case of 'garment' production, there is an additional factor, especially since garment manufacturing is largely a post 1980s phenomenon. The great majority of 'medium' and 'large' enterprises of the private sector garment manufacturing enterprises were established in this particular period. The additional factor emanates from outside Nepal. During the period in question, India had imposed quotas on exports of garments. Nepali informants tell me that to overcome this constraint some Indian entrepreneurs took advantage of the lack of such quotas in Nepal. The extent to which Indian carpet manufacturers have indeed established themselves in Nepal is not known, but

its occurrence would help to explain the great magnitude of the emergence of 'garment' manufacturing in Nepal during the 1980s. Moreover, if the Indian situation is a major factor, then this avenue of private capital's speculation is highly precarious from the point of view of Nepalese entrepreneurs involved.

From a theoretical point of view, the case of 'garment' manufacturing supports Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon's (1980) 'Centre/periphery' thesis. Firm evidence of the extent of Indian private capital involvement in the 'garment' industry in Nepal is needed to make a firm conclusion. Before returning to this issue, the next point in the sketch of the general outline of the industrial manufacturing private sector is a profile of the Nepalese forms of ownership, or 'legal status,' of the firms involved.

3. Form of ownership or 'Legal status' of Enterprise

A privately owned industrial concern in Nepal may be registered in one of three categories designating the legal status of the enterprise: 'Private Ltd. Company', 'Partnership', and 'Sole Proprietor'. The pattern of distribution of these three forms of legal ownership among the three different categories of size is shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Size of Enterprise

Legal status of enterprise	Small (n=302) %	Medium (n=186) %	Large (n=27) %	Total (n=515) %
Private Ltd. Company	87.0	76.9	96.3	83.4
Partnership	1.7	8.6	3.7	4.3
Sole Proprietor	10.3	14.5	0.0	11.3
No. information	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The private sector of manufacturing is primarily 'company business'. In a caste society like Nepal, one wonders whether co-owners of the same company are of the same caste (or, in contemporary official terminology, of the same ethnic group)? There is also another but theoretically bound reason, to explore this question.

Since the growth of the private sector of manufacturing is a new phenomenon, and this 'new born' wealth is organised principally in the form of 'company', then what we may be witnessing the formation of private industrial capital of some magnitude. To put it differently, a 'new' class is emerging in Nepal; the owners or controllers of this newly formed industrial

capital. Identification of the caste or ethnic composition of this 'new' class is important from the point of view of theories about development and underdevelopment, such as the 'dependency' theory that has already been applied to Nepal (see Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon, 1980) but does not cover the period post 1980 in question. Now, to turn to the empirical evidence relating to this issue.

4. The Caste/Ethnic Composition of the Owners of Companies

The relevant information pertaining is given in Table 5.

Table 5: The Caste/Ethnic Composition of the Owners of Companies

Co-owners of some Caste/Ethnic origin	Private Ltd. Companies (n=434) %
Parbatya (Brahmin Chetri)	34.0
Newar	18.2
Tribal	4.4
Marawari	17.0
Indian (unspecified)	4.4
Co-owners NOT of same Caste/Ethnic origin	23.0
Total	100.0

In only 23.0% of the cases are co-owners of the same company not sharing a common caste/ethnic background. Caste/ethnic compatibility between co-owners of a company appears to be a major principle underlying the organisation of private industrial capital in Nepal. Such an apparent concern about caste or ethnic boundaries poses an interesting theoretical problem, since it seems that the 'profit motive' would dominate. This pattern points to yet another significant aspect of the social composition of Nepal's 'new' class.

Over one-fifth of the companies (21.4%) are owned by person (co-owners) located outside the Nepalese caste system, with Marawari co-owners predominating (17.0% of all the companies are owned/controlled by co-owners of this particular ethnic group). Moreover, considering the companies of heterogeneous co-ownership in which at least one of these co-owners is a Marawari, the Marawari presence in this 'new' class is augmented by Marawari part ownership in 59 other companies. In addition, 20 of total of 58 enterprise registered under 'sole proprietorship' are also owned by Marawaris. This means in effect that approximately 30.0% of all the enterprises involve a Marawari ownership in whole or part (irrespective of legal status).

Given the relatively high representation of Marawaris in this 'new' class, it

becomes important to study this ethnic group intensively and to monitor its industrial activities, as their entrenchment in this field may have economic, political and social implications for Nepal's future industrial development.

5. The Caste/Ethnic Dimension of Fields of Production

Data relating the field of production and caste/ethnic composition of the ownership of each enterprise is contained in Table 6.

Table 6: Caste/Ethnic Ownership of Enterprise

Field of Production	Parbatya (n=165)	Newar (n=87)	Tribal (n=23)	Marawari (n=94)	Indian Unspeci- fied (n=28)	Mixed (n=120)	Total (n=517)
Food and drink	38.3	24.1	61.0	36.8	32.0	29.2	34.0
Garment	17.0	18.4	21.7	24.0	32.0	27.5	21.9
Building Construction (products)	22.4	22.0	13.0	20.2	25.0	20.8	21.3
Household durables	1.8	10.3	0.0	5.3	4.0	3.3	4.3
Health (products)	4.8	6.9	0.0	4.3	0.0	4.2	5.0
Education (products)	3.0	3.4	0.0	2.1	0.0	3.3	2.7
Miscellaneous	7.7	13.8	4.3	5.4	7.0	7.5	8.7
No information	3.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	2.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This table provides further grounds for advancing the general proposition that the 'new' class in Nepal is significantly 'foreign' (i.e., outside the Nepalese caste system) in its social composition. This is most clearly evident in the field of 'garment' manufacturing.

Table 6 reveals that although 77.2% of all the enterprises are engaged in commodity production related to the fields of 'food and drink', 'garment,' and 'building construction' significantly higher proportions of the Marawari and 'Indian' owned firms are engaged in these fields (80.0% and 89.0%, respectively). Of the firms owned by indigenous Nepalese caste/ethnic groups, only those owned by Tribals rival either the Marawari or Indian owned firms (95.7% of the Tribal owned firms engage in one or other of these three fields of production). However it should be stressed that Tribals own the smallest number of firms, 23 of the total 517. In 'garment' manufacturing, only the proportions of enterprises owned by Marwari, Indian and 'mixed' caste/ethnic groups exceed that of the total enterprises engaged specifically in garment manufacturing (21.9% of the total of 517 enterprises

are so engaged), whereas 24% of the Marawari, 32.0% of the Indian and 27.5% of the 'Mixed' caste or ethnic group owned enterprises were operating in this particular field of production. If we recall that more than half of the enterprises with a 'mixed' caste or ethnic composition of ownership involve Marawari ownership, then the claim may be made that not only is 'garment' manufacturing predominantly 'foreign' in its ownership profile, but that it is essentially a Marawari enclave. This suggests that at least in the area of 'garment' production, industrial development sponsored by private capital in Nepal may be tied to the interests of private capital in India.

6. The Regional Distribution of Enterprises Owned by the Various Caste Ethnic groups

For historical, geographical, political, and other considerations, the preserve of Marawari and other Indian entrepreneurs in Nepal has been contained in the highly fertile area known as the Terai, bordering India. Whilst this may hold as far as entrepreneurial activity based on agricultural production, it may not necessarily apply in the case of entrepreneurship involving the industrial type of production being examined here.

Table 7: Caste/Ethnic Ownership of Enterprise

Regional Location Of enterprise	Parbatya (n= 165) %	Newar (n= 87) %	Tribal (n= 23) %	Marawari (n= 94) %	Indian (Unspec) (n= 28) %	Mixed (n= 12) %	Total (n= 517) %
Far West	6.7	0.0	4.3	3.2	0.0	5.0	4.0
Mid West	7.9	2.3	8.7	9.6	0.0	5.8	6.4
West	12.7	17.2	30.5	3.2	3.6	4.2	10.1
Central	41.2	70.1	43.5	45.7	39.3	59.2	51.1
East	24.2	7.0	8.7	29.8	46.4	15.8	20.9
No Information	7.3	3.4	4.3	8.5	10.7	10.0	7.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Where as just over half of the enterprises were located in the Central Development Region (51.1%), a significantly higher proportion (70.1%) of the Newar owned concerns were located there. This is not surprising since the Central Region incorporates Kathmandu Valley the location of the largest and fastest growing urban settlement in Nepal therefore the major domestic market for the commodities involved, and the ancestral homeland of the

Newars.

Surprisingly, a high proportion (45.7%) of the Marawari owned enterprises are also located in the Central Region—a far larger proportion than for any other group bar the Newars and the “Mixed”. Since more than half of the latter involve a Marawari as a co-owner, the Marawari presence in this Region in terms of ownership is even more extensive than might be assumed at first glance. Neither are the Marawari interests nor those of Indians generally are contained in the Eastern Development Region.

7. A ‘New’ Working Class?

This exploration would be gravely inadequate nothing were said about the labor power commanded by this newly constituted industrial capital. If the owners/controllers of this industrial capital constitute a ‘new’ class in this predominantly agrarian society, then this automatically entails the emergence of ‘new’ working class, the industrial workers who provide the labour power for the industrialists.

Unfortunately, the records examined for this study provided no information about the workers in each of the enterprises. The Department of Industry relies of periodical sample surveys to obtain such information. Such a research method was not used for this stage of the inquiry. But since the issue is extremely important, the material contained in the Department of Industry's publication (1984) might be used, albeit with caution. This publication provides detailed information relating to labour in each of the 155 non-government manufacturing enterprises operating during the fiscal year 1983/84.

First of all, the private sector, as represented in the Department's survey, consists of:

94 (60.7%) ‘Small’
52 (33.5%) ‘Medium’; and
9 (5.8%) ‘Large’ enterprises.

This pattern of distribution in terms of ‘size’ is comparable to that based on all enterprises in this sector in 1985, as outlined earlier. This perhaps justifies some trust in the other figures.

Focusing on the question of labour, the private sector employed a total of 31,222 persons in 1983/84. The manner this workforce is distributed among the various size enterprises and in terms of the workers’ national identity (‘Nepalese’ vs. ‘Foreign’) can be seen in Table 8.

Table 8: Employees in each 'Size' Enterprise

Nationality of Employee	Small (n= 6,964) %	Medium (n= 7,826) %	Large (n= 16,432) %	Total (n= 31,222) %
Nepalese	90.7	77.4	85.0	84.4
'Foreigner'	9.3	22.6	15.0	15.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As might be expected, more than 3/4 of this industrial workforce (77.7%) is employed by the 'Medium' and 'Large' enterprises. However, that a significantly high proportion of 'foreign' workers are also found in these enterprises (22.6%, in 'Medium' and 15.0% in 'Large', respectively). In contrast, 'Small' enterprises appear to employ a relatively small proportion of 'foreign' workers. Given that the majority of the 'Medium' and 'Large' enterprises in this sector are not located in the Terai, and given that 'foreign' workers refers mainly to persons from India, then the 'new' working class would seem to be significantly divided: first, its indigenous component is likely to be divided along caste lines; and second its 'foreign' component would tend to divide the working class as a whole into two distinct National groups, Nepalese and Indian. How these divisions of the 'new' working class relate to corresponding divisions within the other 'new' class, which owns/controls the factories, is an important question. But unfortunately it is an issue which we cannot explore empirically, since the caste/ethnic identity of the owners of these enterprises is not given in the Department of Industry's publication. Without this kind of information it is impossible to explore the very important topic of class relations in this very new Nepalese context. Further research in this field is necessary, not only for theoretical reasons, but also for policy decisions concerning Nepal's future pattern of industrial development.

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RESEARCH NOTE

**NATION, NATIONALISM AND
SOME ISSUES OF NATIONAL CONSENSUS**

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Generally, terms such as state, nation, nationalism and national integration are used interchangeably. Even social scientists and politicians do not significantly differentiate in the definitions, usages and nuances of these terms. The Charter of the United Nations also declares that for a political entity to be recognised as a nation state it must fulfill certain obligations, of which the qualifications of sovereignty, independence and fixed territorial expression are essential. A similar approach is maintained in the field of international relations the theory of international relations reserves the term nation state for a state which acquires an independent sovereign status.

However, in political science, especially in the field of political development distinct differences are maintained in the definition, practice and connotation of terms like state, nation, nation building and nationalism. A state is defined as an objective reality in a society having a legal and territorial expression of people organised under one government. The state, derives its authority by "legitimate coercion."¹ Moreover, the state is a place where people develop their sense of nationalism and nation building activities in greater application.

A nation is broadly defined as the aggregate of subjective values of people in a society. As an abstract concept, a nation is a psychological attitude or the emotional attachment of people with their sense of belonging in a given society. Kohn defines a nation as a "state of mind, an act of consciousness the individual's identification of himself with 'We group' to which he gives supreme loyalty."² The idea of a nation, therefore, is a kind of consciousness relating to subjective values like race, religion, language, culture, traditions and such other common behaviours of people in a society. Apparently, these values help to maintain internal cohesion in order to differentiate from other groups on the basis of the "We-They" concept.

The meaning of nationalism is political. As Kohn observes, "the sense of nationalism is inconceivable without idea of popular sovereignty", in other words, the meaning of nationalism is assertions of citizenary rights in the affairs of state. As the sense of nation is nationalism, it is related to the consciousness of sacrifices made in the past and willingness to make further ones in the future. In other words, nationalism is "a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of society of states," writes Snyder.³

State building is said to be the concentration of authority, maintenance of law and order, establishment of a rational administrative system. Nation building is the promotion of the sense of nationalism. Nation building is referred to as the multi-dimensional process of a society for developing "a common political consciousness." Almond and Powell refer to penetration and integration as the problems in state building, and extension of loyalty and commitment to nation building.

It is therefore attributed that promotion of the sense of nation and nationalism is possible only through the all-round development of a society. Secular policy, greater economic opportunities and greater political participation would all help in developing a common political consciousness in the society. The more opportunities provided to the people, the stronger will be the chances of nation building. Unless a society reduces economic exploitation, enhances the concept of popular sovereignty in the political process, and develops a value consensus within culturally discrete groups, the prospect of further infusing a sense of nationalism becomes a distant possibility.⁴

As a matter of fact, such a concept of nationalism was not popularised in the West until the end of the sixteenth century. The West realised only during the seventeenth century that the people's power was the basis of nationalism. The Western countries denied the traditional concept of a ruler such as "Whose acts are not subject to any other, and whose will cannot be overridden" on the grounds of the people's interests. They were struggling to assert people's power. Ultimately, they succeeded in receiving charters like the French Declaration of Human Rights, the American Bill of Rights, The English Bill of Rights, etc, thereby asserting the concept of popular sovereignty as the basis of nationalism and nation building. The concept of popular sovereignty gained popularity in the West as it proved successful as well as essential in developing the sense of nationalism among the people of a given nation.

In the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, despite the fact that "popular sovereignty" would undoubtedly form the basis for

nationalism, the concept did not receive much attention due to various reasons. In the first place, the traditional institutions did not work for democratic development. Second, most of the nationalist leaders tried to marry ideology with tactical consideration. Democratic values like liberty, equality, participation and secularism began to erode when the nationalist leaders changed their role from that of leaders of movements to leaders of government. Their perspective on issues and objectives changed. Third in most of the developing countries, the spirit of nation building got sidetracked due to an emphasis on state building activities, because the task of making government was equated with that of the regime's continuity. And finally, the political parties could not prove as effective as they could be to help institutionalise democracy in their countries. Most of the time, the political parties indulged in parochial and petty things rather than solving broad national issues. However, some political parties and nationalist leaders have proved effective in inculcating a true sense of nationalism among those who worked according to the goals of liberal democracy. In such countries, political institutions have become resilient against the trends of national disintegration.

The above observations prove that the spirit of liberal democracy forms the basis for nationalism. Some despots, dictators, reactionaries, and fundamentalists may not like the doctrine, but it has become universal phenomenon. The people at large have already accepted that the sense of nationalism is inconceivable in the absence of popular sovereignty. In recent years, even the communist states have realised its importance. *Marxian dictums that assert that nationalism is fraud*, liberal democracy is the bourgeoisie concept, the state and government are corrupt institutions, and their call for internationalism and weathering away of the state are all proved futile and ineffective. Evidently, the impracticability of Marxism on the issue of nationalism was realised even during 1930s. when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The rallying cry of Stalin was "save the motherland." In recent days, the importance of liberal democracy for the promotion of nationalism has become a popular movement in most of the communist states. The political changes taking diametrically opposite turns in Eastern Europe could be cited in support of the preceding statement. Even the Soviet Union is undergoing numerous changes as it accepts the values of liberal democracy. A few community states continue to change with the application of repressive measures. However, none of the measures will prove effective in stopping the process of change.

The case of Nepal is also not much different from those societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Though the state of Nepal assumed its present nationhood in the second half of the eighteenth century, its politics could not

initiate for any nation building activity. Development of a common political consciousness remained a dream in the Nepali society. As the rulers were absolute and responsible to none. Their primary loyalty remained to the family interests rather than the interests of the nation. The early Shah period of 1769-1846, and the Rana rule of 1846-1951, mainly bent upon restraining the growth of political awareness among the people. The Rana oligarchy continued uninterrupted simply because it was buttressed by a policy of internal repression and an external policy of keeping the Nepali people in total isolation. But as soon as the people of Nepal became somewhat politically conscious, the Rana edifice of power simply crumbled in the revolution of 1951 despite its restrictive measures.

The 1951 revolution was an epoch-making event in Nepali politics, as it dispelled the traditional concept of political absolutism and laid a new foundation of nationalism. Like in the West, the revolution emphasised that the sense of nationalism is impossible without the birth of popular sovereignty. Especially the Nepali Congress, the first democratic party of Nepal, popularised the concept that democracy and nationalism are inseparable. Hence, all forces- the King, the Rana's and the Nepali Congress- agreed to herald a smooth and spontaneous transition from tradition to modernity, thereby entering into a general compromise for ushering in a democratic era. However, within a short span of time, the "democratic innovations" developed after the revolution of 1951 began to flounder. Retrogressive forces emerged in the Nepali society. Some of them were schooled, trained and rewarded under the Rana autocracy; some of them were reactionaries; others were royalists. Some were even leaders of Nepali Congress afraid of true democracy in the country. King Mahendra's commitment to liberal democracy was doubtful. He started mobilising the support of these groups. Eventually, giving all sovereign powers to the king, the 1959 Constitution came into operation, making a major departure from the much anticipated objectives of the 1951 revolution. The reasons were that the spirit of popular sovereignty was not viewed with favour by the king, he was unprepared to compromise his position, and the political parties were incapable of resisting the King's unpredictable moves.

The 1959 Constitution was considered nonetheless to be a compromising formula between the palace and the people, with a distant objective of developing democracy in the country. But King Mahendra was ambitious to become a King-leader rather than remain content with simple head of state in compromise with the elected representatives. Thus he disrupted the "democratic innovations" installed by the revolution of 1951 without giving reasonable time for to prove their worth.

As a substitute for Parliamentary Democracy, the Panchayat System was

introduced in 1961. The system claimed to embody indigenous characteristics of Nepal and be the most appropriate solution to problems of national integration. Like the previous system, the Panchayat System was also garbed as democratic. However, its features were completely alien to democratic norms as practised elsewhere in the world. Its mechanism of people's participation were designed so as to form a centrally controlled system completely guided by the King.

Three decades of experiment of the Panchayat System proved despite its many catchy slogans that it was completely incapable of instilling the sense of nationalism. As the system was tailored to attend to Royal wishes its institutional processes, including independent role-performance, sub-system autonomy, recruitment and participation, were all affected by active Royal leadership. The working mechanism of Panchayat System was simply perfunctory in its character. The "old role" and vested interest group maintained order, but without the concept of stability. Political stability entails enthusiastic participation of people through the sharing of power and socio-economic development. The concept of sharing of power was conspicuous by its absence under popular participation, because absolute power was vested in the King. The social policy adopted by the Panchayat System did not appear capable of dealing with the growing awareness of the people brought about by the process of modernization. Ironically, genuine economic development was not the main objective of the system. Plans formulated with preconceived notions and objectives were designed to maintain the entrenched interests of status-bound elites and vested interest groups of the society. For these groups, an integrated radical approach to development was anathema. Therefore, Nepal's economic problems in relation to nation building became mind boggling, difficult if not totally unsolvable. Under such circumstances, a tendency of alienation from and frustration with the system was natural and inevitable.

Though the Panchayat System disallowed opposition and adopted various measures restricting the fundamental rights of people, the conscious section of the Nepali people did not remain silent. They were demanded restoration of democracy through various means, sometimes with armed revolution and sometimes through peaceful demonstration. The Nepali Congress especially undertook the leadership of such activities. As democracy, nationalism, socialism and secularism were the guiding principles of the Nepali Congress, it relentlessly involved itself and tenaciously held to its principles, even after the termination of Parliamentary System in 1960. As the Panchayat System denied systemic opposition, the party in-exile was bound to adopt different strategies in which many of its workers lost their lives. Though the party faced both organizational and financial problems, it did not deviate from its

ideological goals. The charismatic personality of its leaders and the towering leadership of the party eventually led to restoration of democracy in the country.

The role of Communist Party, however, remained ambivalent. Some of the communists joined the Panchayat System, "still believing in Marxism," and others joined the system with three considerations – to provide the party with an organization within which communist cadres could operate, to forge an easy access to such administrative institutions like the Panchayats and class organizations which they had been assiduously attempting to infiltrate, and to occupy dominant positions in the national politics so as to compete with the Nepali Congress.⁵ Adopting these strategies, a certain section of the communists successfully checked the liberal trends in the system. Even during the National Referendum of 1979, certain section of the communists boycotted it with a fear that restoration of multi-party system would be the victory of the Nepali Congress. A pamphlet stated "why bring in a wolf in the cave when a jackal is already there." However, the moderate and liberal sections of Communist Party did support the multi-party side.

As a matter of fact, the bonafide intentions of moderate communists remained clear when they joined the February 18, 1989 democratic movement spearheaded by the Nepali Congress. The Nepali people who pin up their hopes on the democratic role of Nepali Congress joined the movement from various walks of life. Similarly, the role of moderate communists during the movement was no less significant in generating tremendous head in Nepali society. Indeed, due to these reasons, the Panchayat System crumbled like a house of cards, heralding in a new era of nationalism and consensus in Nepali society.

The issues of national consensus could be of manifold variety because these differ from approach to approach. However, there are certain specific issues which are vital to all Nepali people. Such issues include the position of monarchy, socio-economic policy, national polity, internal security and external relations. Regarding the position of monarchy, its historical role can hardly be ignored. Leaving aside the tyrannical role played by this institution at times, the monarch contributes a distinct sense of national identity. During the middle half of the eighteenth century, the monarchy was instrumental in the unification of warring kingdoms into a single nation, setting aside the cold war rivalry between British India and Imperial China. Besides, the political transformation taken place in March-April, 1990, was not a "total revolution" completely delinked from the past. The political change was neither the Iranian type nor the Afghanistan one directed towards installation of fundamentalism and radicalism. It was a kind of moderate change in power structure and the nature of national polity. From absolutism, the power

transferred to the people, making them sovereign and defining democracy as the basis of nationalism. The movement proved that the traditional role of monarchy was antithetical to modernization, and its anachronistic concept of nationalism was against the sentiments of the people. As Rajni Kothari, an Indian scholar writes, "no society can live without traditions, and the challenge of modernization is to build up traditions into modernity." The role of Nepali monarchy is to work for modernity. It is a symbol of national unity, constitutional head as well as a partner to help nurture the newly born democracy in the country.

The democratic polity recognizing sovereign rights of the people is another consensual issue of Nepali society. The movement proved that nation building, as a cooperative and collective venture of all forces involving the mechanism of popular participation, should be so designed in a political system where people feel an emotional attachment to it. The conditions essential for such a situation are the provisions of integrative institutions like independent political structures with checks and balances, political parties of ideological clarity, wide electoral base, universal adult franchise, political opposition, broad representation of society, recognition of quality of people on merit principles, and above all, guarantee of fundamental rights of people. The role of political parties seem important in participatory democracy because they ought to bear the responsibilities of resolving the issues of national consensus. There has been a mushroom growth of political parties in Nepal, creating confusion on issues of national consensus, since the parties are sponsored by the conservative elements. The difference in their professed objectives and sometimes pernicious motives can disrupt the whole political process of the country. Therefore, the political parties calling themselves democrat should prove their democratic behaviour in action. Similarly, the left forces are required to extend their cooperation to help institutionalise the newly born democracy in the country.

Economic policy is another issue requiring serious attention in Nepal. The economic situation of Nepal appears to be at the brink of disaster. Nepal is one of the poorest countries of the world. In such a situation, what then could be an appropriate economic policy for alleviating the poor people?, How can equitable justice in the competition for valued resources and distribution of goods and services be provided? Generally, three kinds of policy issues are identified: the Marxist or communist mode, the capitalist model, and the mixed or democratic socialistic model. The Marxist model has proved ineffective in solving economic issues on the grounds that the economic issue as a human and psychological phenomenon does not take place in terms of material needs alone. Though the material need is one of the vital aspects, the other aspects like the sense of possession and ownership,

individuality and such other economic rights are not less significant factors attending the material needs. "Everybody's property is nobody's property and economic activities for national development could hardly be initiated without developing the sense of attachment to these. This vital aspect is missing in the Marxist model. The great hiatus in the economic condition of people created by the Marxist model in the five East European countries provides reference to this point. Ultimately, realization against the "socialised economic system" is seen even in the Soviet Union, and to a certain degree, in China too. The competitive or capitalistic model too is not applicable in a situation like that of Nepal. There are many legacies affecting to it. First the feudalistic economic structure of Nepal was not oriented towards industrialization of the country, providing the grounds for capitalism. Second, the idea of forming private capital did not develop in Nepal, because the state policy remained always exploitative of the people. Thirdly, the internal as well as external factors affected the positive growth of the Nepali economy. And, the last but not the least, capitalism is rooted in individual liberty which the Nepali people could never enjoy.

The democratic socialistic model is believed to be the most tenable model to help solve the economic issues of Nepal. As a mixed model, it comprises of the positive values of both former models. The role and responsibility of the state on the one hand, and the role and responsibility of individuals on the other are clearly defined. The role and responsibility of the state are to: dispense economic justice in the competition for valued resources and distribution of goods and services, create conditions favorable for economic activities and to mediate and bridge the increasing gap between the rich and the poor through a policy of scientific taxation and other such tariff measures. Above all, the role of state under this model is to maintain a balance between the constitutional order, security and welfare of all its people. The economic rights of the individual tie up intimately with other democratic rights. Each individual, with his own ability and performance, can enjoy economic rights. But such "self-regarding" rights limit together with "other regarding rights."

In fact, the socialistic model has become popular due to many positive reasons. First, it suggests indigenization of economic development by mobilization of local resources. Second, it suggests modernization of society with continuity and change. Third, it recommends internalization of external values to help develop the local values. And the last, with "small is beautiful" as its concept, it suggests economic development from below. Balance between ecology and society are its major concern. It therefore suggests preservation of nature for the better living of mankind. The Nepali Congress, a democratic party of Nepal, stands by this model. If the policies

of the model are sincerely implemented, it would definitely help solve the economic problems of Nepal to a large extent.

The social policy of Nepal is another issue in national consensus. The Nepali society is multi-ethnic in character, and its problem of national integration is to achieve unity in diversity. Homogeneity through centralized domination does not satisfy the disparate segments of the society. Though cohesiveness of Nepali society has not shown any ominous sign of breaking down the different ethnic groups are voicing complaints that their language, religion and culture are not receiving favourable treatment from the state. During the national referendum (1979-80), quite a few ethnic groups held conferences and campaigns for recognition of their language and cultural rights. After the restoration of democracy, intensification of such demands has alarmingly increased. The different ethnic groups are not lagging behind in articulating their concerns. The people of Tarai feel alienated from the national mainstream due to the biased attitude of the ruling elites. Similarly, the people of Mongoloid origin argue that they are not receiving equal treatment like those of the Aryan origin. The three percent Muslim segment of Nepali society is also demanding due recognition of its language, religion and culture. There are quite a number of "indigenous" people who still live in a state of complete isolation.

Till now, the socio-political system of Nepal could not provide adequate channel for the neglected sections of the society. As political institutions became ineffective and vested interest groups thrived on the social disparity, both covert and overt conflicts in Nepali society were likely to generate amount of tensions and misunderstandings. In such a situation, one could hardly bank on the resilient character of the society. Now the context is changed. A broad based secular policy and provision for articulating ethnic identity could promote integrationist trends. Its timely realisation is felt to preserve and promote social harmony among the different ethnic groups of Nepal. The success of national integration depend, to a considerable extent, upon provisions for "retention of minimum value-consensus" of culturally discrete groups of society by devising integrative institutions and behaviour.

The problems of internal or individual security are also treated as an issue of national consensus affecting the growth of nationalism. Though nationalism is an aggregation of subjective values, its fuller application is hardly possible in absence of an objective condition, that is , a nation state. The meaning of security is generally defined as preservation of territorial indentity. In essence, security is the role of a nation state aimed at protecting the "vital national interests." Rostow suggests "the constitutional order" as a means for internal security and Morgenthau recommends developing "national power" as the means for external security. Combining both these

suggestions,"domestic policy resiliency and foreign policy consistency," treats Rosenau for internal or individual security and external security. Internally, security issues include devising potential capability and support bases of capability in society. Externally, it includes confirmation of symbolic outputs oriented towards maintaining balanced interactions in dealing with other nations. As stated by Rosenau, the goals, contents and style of foreign policy based on resilient domestic policy would all help solving the issues of national security.

Whether the problem of an "external threat" to Nepal's security is real or imaginary is difficult to ascertain. Some vulnerable areas such as the tyranny of geography, geo-strategic location, size, economic compulsions, socio-cultural patterns and national polity have affected the protection of the vital national interests" of Nepal. Nepal is sometimes labelled as "security shield," "buffer zone," "sphere of influence," and even a "periphery of the periphery." The theme of this paper is not when and how Nepal has faced security problems, but issues of consensus,

The meaning of security is the preservation of "vital national interest". But the interpretation of security may neither be equated merely with the guarded anachronistic explanations of the regime. Nor should it be related with nascent nationalism born out of chauvanism, fomenting hatred towards another state. This is how the security perception of Nepal has been defined. King Prithvi narayan Shah, the founder of modern Nepal, stated that Nepal is "like a yam between two huge boulders." He developed a strategy to deal with the problem: "praja mota bhaya rajya baliyo huncha"; "the people endowed with strength and courage save the country." His successors, however, failed to create the people into a potential force to counter the security problem. The Rana rule defined security in terms of the regime's continuity. Hence they accomodated British interests in a policy that remained unaltered even after the British withdrawal India. The 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty pushed Nepal further under the "security shield" of India. The governments of the post-revolution period were transient in character. They could hardly dare define security issues in terms of popular consensus. The first ever popularly elected Nepali Congress government was in a position to define issues of national consensus by building the potential capability and developing support bases. Unfortunately, it was cut short before it proved its worth. Like the Rana rule, the Panchayati elites also defined security perceptions with the motive of maintaining the regime's continuity. Taking advantage of changes of the international situation, some calculative moves were undertaken, but these proved self-defeating. Even during the period of national crisis that started from March 23, 1988, the people gave no support to the system because the system was essentially anti-people. One of the reasons

attributed to the failure of Panchayat System was its inconsistency in foreign policy arising from an immaturely defined perception of security issues.

The vulnerable areas affecting the issues of security are equally important subject even in the changed context. Brinkmanship is a regular feature of the Nepali press. Nepal has relations with a host of countries, and India and China are its immediate neighbours. The behaviour of these countries bears both the covert and overt influences on Nepal. At times, the triangular relations-India versus China vis-a-vis Nepal-have shape some security issues in Nepal. In this context, Nepal's capacity to influence other nations is limited. Nepal's priority is to maintain territorial integrity and national sovereignty. This requires Nepal's leadership to use "domestic policy resiliency" and foreign policy consistency in devising potential capability and support bases of capability. At the same time, the countries which bound Nepal geographically, with their centuries of social, religious, cultural, and economic ties, must magnanimously understand the sensitivities of smaller countries like Nepal.

Last, but not the least, an issue of national consensus is the new constitution of Nepal. Its objectives are to institutionalise democracy by recognizing the sovereign rights of people and establishing a multi-party system and constitutional monarchy. As a national democratic constitution, it will have to adapt to the ever-changing conditions of Nepali society. By securing social peace and progress, safeguarding individual rights, and promoting national well-being, the constitution will hopefully help further enhance and consolidate Nepali nationalism.

Notes

1. Mostafa Rejai and Cynthai Enloe, "Nation States And State Nation" in *International Studies Quaterly*, Vol. 8 (1069), pp. 93-103, and Claude J. Burtenshaw, "Book Review On state And Nation" in *The Western Political Quaterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (June 1065), pp. 394-5.
2. Hans Kohn, "Nationalism As Group Consciousness" in Louis L. Snyder ed., *The Dynamics Of Nationalism: Reading In The Meaning And Development* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964), p. 18.
3. Snyder, Ibid, p. 373.
4. Ananta Raj Poudyal, "Nation Building In Nepal: A Case Study Of The Post Revolution period (1950081)", "An Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Tribhuvan University, 1986.
5. See Matribhumi, July 9, 1962, and Nepal Samachar, June I, 1962. For other detail See Bhuvan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, *Democratic Innovations In Nepal: A Case Study Of Political Acculturation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 454-56.

MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF HIERARCHY AND GENDER IN BAHUN-CHETRI HOUSEHOLDS

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Introduction

I begin with a mild 'deconstruction' of the title of Collier's book, *Marriage and Inequality in Classless Societies* (1988)¹. I assume that the 'unsaid' of the term 'classless' describes societies in which social relations are characterised by equality, whether normatively or praxically defined. Further, the term classless immediately suggests a marxist perspective which locates the origin of equality in the mode of production. As a result, the title proposes it is marriage that introduces inequality into societies which are, in terms of economic infrastructure, fundamentally egalitarian. In this paper I take up one implication of this deconstruction--that marriage transforms equality into inequality--but do so with respect to Brahmin-Chetri society in Nepal, a society that is fundamentally hierarchical.

Perhaps it is not surprising that an ethnographer of South Asia would pick up on this implication since it recalls a point made consistently by Dumont (1980) but which Collier does not appear to recognise. Whether one is dealing with a society which professes hierarchical or equalitarian values, both hierarchy and equality are inextricable in social life--they are two sides of the same coin. In this respect, instead of conceiving of hierarchy and equality as discrete dimensions of social life, I treat them as a configuration of co-implication (see Munn 1973). This configurational conception of hierarchy-equality is significant for ethnographic analysis because to refer to one is to entail the existence of the other and to describe the character of one entails identifying its relations with the other. Thus in analysing social inequality or hierarchy² the task is not merely, as Collier suggests, to explain how inequality is socially organised (Collier 1988:197). Such an approach assumes that somehow equality is more 'natural' and therefore does not need to be socially organised to exist. Instead the approach adopted here

necessitates explaining how both hierarchy and equality are mutually constituted in social practice and specifying the configurational relations between them. Thus in analysing marriage in Bahun-Chetri society I do so not just to explain how it is a condition for the existence of hierarchy and/or equality in social relations, but to show how it mediates and thereby engenders a particular relationship between them.

The understanding of marriage in the constitution of hierarchy and equality in Brahmin-Chetri society is derived from ethnographic studies among Chetri households of Kholagaun Hamlet in Banaspati Village. Banaspati is located near the southern edge of the Kathmandu Valley in an area populated largely by Hindus with close historical and cultural affinity to the North Indian pattern of marriage and hierarchy. In this area of the Valley the rural settlement pattern is non-nucleated with relatively small clusters of houses scattered amongst agricultural land. These clusters of houses are locally recognised social and residential units (*gaun*) which I call 'hamlets'. Banaspati consists of twelve hamlets, each of which is locally acknowledged to be inhabited by a particular social group distinguished by jat, ethnic and/or descent group affiliation. Although hamlets consist of households of several such groups, most are dominated by one or two of them. This gives each hamlet a particular social identity. For example, one hamlet is composed entirely of Tamang households; another, curiously, is dominated by Brahmin households and by Untouchable Leatherworker (*Sarki*) households. Kholagaun, the focus of this paper, is one of the larger hamlets consisting of sixty-seven households of which fifty-seven are members of a single Chetri agnatic lineage.

Chetri social life is organised by hierarchical practices and they rank themselves just below Brahmin in the local jat hierarchy. Chetri marriage illustrates the inextricability of hierarchy and equality in social life and the way in which it is central in socially constituting the configurational relations between them. On the one hand, Chetri marriage is formally isogamous and centrifugal in the sense that in arranging marriages for their children, Kholagaun Chetris searched outside Banaspati for spouses belonging to Chetri lineages and clans of equal status to their own. After marriage, the wife is expected to reside with her husband in his natal household. On the other hand, Chetri marriage is 'hypergamous'³ in the sense that the wife-receiving household becomes superior to the wife-giving household. Here marriage seems to transform relations of status equality into hierarchy. Paradoxically, however, such marriages are also the pre-condition for constituting the equality among Chetri lineages and clans that allows marriages to be isogamous.

As a result of these complexities of marriage, Chetris have an extensive

network of affinal links with other Chettri households, lineages and clan throughout the Kathmandu Valley and this forms the limits of what I later call the Chettri regional caste. It is within this Chettri regional caste that I explore how marriage implicates gender relations and how these in turn mediate and constitutes a particular configurational relation between hierarchy and equality. I begin with the Chettri household because marriage and its cultural implications for gender and hierarchy are ontologically domestic phenomena.

Marriage and the Domestic Ontology

The Brahmin-Chettri household (*pariwar*) is an institution embedded in Hindu dharma. Without recognising the centrality of dharma, the Brahmin-Chettri household would appear much like domestic groups in many other societies: an ensemble of social relations and shared activities concerning kinship (marriage, descent, affinity), access to productive resources (usually agricultural land), co-residence, and ritual. However, dharma identifies the essence of the *pariwar* and thus defines it holistically. This is important for it is in relation to the essence of the household that those social relations and shared activities constituting it take on the particular character that defines them as Brahmin-Chettri domestic practices.

As Chettris understand it, dharma consists of the specific duties to be performed by each distinct category of people. In Hindu society, there are two cross-cutting systems of categories of homogeneous people--the division of society into *varna* (castes) and the division of the individual's lifetime in society into four *ashrama* (stages of life)--and each *varna* and *ashrama* is endowed with a distinct code of moral conduct. One of these stages of life is that of the Householder⁴ (*Grihastha ashrama*) whose dharma provides the basis for a holistic apperception of the Chettri household.

Brahmin-Chettri ethnosociology recognises four stages through which males may pass during their lives in society--the Celibate Student (*Brahmacharya Ashrama*), the Householder (*Grihastha Ashrama*), the Forest Dweller (*Vanaprastha Ashrama*), and the Wandering Ascetic (*Sannyasa Ashrama*). These four, however, divide into two more fundamental social personae which Dumont (1960:37f) recognises as the distinction between the Renouncer and the Householder, between detachment from the world and attachment to the world, or between asceticism and passion. The Renouncer and the Householder are personifications ('symbolic types' [see Gratoff 19??]) of the two contrasting forms of energy or heat--*tapas* and *kama*--underlying all action in the world. *Tapas* is the energy or heat generated through ascetic practice, epitomised by chastity, and the consequent detachment from the world; *kama* is the energy or heat of human

passion, epitomised by sexual desire, and the consequent attachment to the world.

As portrayed in classical Hindu literature (see Heesterman 1982) the Householder's dharma includes three principle duties: begetting offspring; discharging his responsibilities as a member of the community, typified by feeding ascetics (Brahmacharya, Vanaprastha and Sannyasa); and performing sacrifice. The first is a direct manifestation of the sexual desire central to the concept of kama. The moral fulfilment of this desire by the Householder necessarily entails an attachment to a woman which must be legitimated by marriage. The second is epitomised by feeding those members of the community whose dharma prohibits them from forming attachments to worldly things. The duty to feed the ascetics entails a moral relation to land and the establishment of legitimated economic and political relations consequent to subsistence production on that land. This is the basis for rights of ownership in and subsistence from land being for Nepalis some of the most important diacritical markers of household membership. The third duty is an activity which brings the Householder into contact with the gods whose primary characteristic in relation to humans is greater purity. Accordingly, the performance of sacrificial rites minimally requires the Householder to be in a state of purity achieved by ascetic practices and a fire as the symbol and vehicle of sacrifice.

In terms of dharma, the Householder is the archetypal 'man-in-the-world' largely motivated by kama. He lives in a household which is an institution composed of hierarchical structures, practices and persons characterised by passion and attachment to the world that are consequent to and enable the fulfilment of his dharma. Thus the concept of Grihastha dharma has a double significance: it concerns the duties of the Householder as one category of person in the human world, and it also expresses the distinctive holistic character of the institution in which the Householder exists, in which he realises his nature through the performance of his dharma, and which is the objectification of the performance of his dharma.

Marriage is a central relationship of the Brahmin-Chettri pariwar precisely because it is what must be established for the Householder to engage in moral action that satisfies his sexual passion and fulfils his duty. The Chettri pariwar is holistically oriented by men, and women become a part of it through marriage as a means for those men to fulfil their dharma. Here is the basis of the encompassment characteristic of the hierarchical relation between husband and wife, between affines more generally and perhaps between man and woman in Nepali society. Dharma defines the nature of the whole household and it is through domestic practices that men directly uphold dharma. Men are associated with the goal of moral action in the world--to

sustain the cosmos; women are the means and accordingly they are subordinated to their husbands. As the personification of dharma in the household, the husband is worthy of respect (*mannu parne*) from his wife and those to whom she gives birth. The sons borne of such desire are the man reborn (see Kondos 1989) and form the patrilineal *santan*, the two to four generation line of agnates that is the core of the Chetri household. The sons are the substantialisation of his intrinsic constitution and thus form a kind of collective being in the household marked by the concept of *santan*. The men of the *santan* are co-parceners in the land whose product sustains the members of the household and enable men to fulfil their duty to the ascetics. Accordingly, the household appears as a patrilineal core with women attached to it by marriage who enable the men to morally satisfy their passion and to realise their dharma. This is the basic hierarchical division within the household. The daughters borne of the marital relation are given away to other men of other households. One householder, therefore, provides the means, in the person of his daughter, for another to fulfil his dharma. This as we shall see later underlies the idea of marriage as the meritorious 'gift of the virgin'. As a result of giving such a gift, there is established between the households affinal relations with a specific hierarchical character.

Marriage and Descent

While I have highlighted marriage as an ontological and practical condition for the establishment of the Brahmin-Chetri household, it should also have been evident that agnatic descent is functionally and conceptually inseparable from marriage in the constitution of the household and therefore of hierarchy and gender relations. Marriage incorporates Brahmin-Chetri conceptions of human reproduction, particularly the maternal and paternal contributions to the child, which they used to explain the explicit agnatic genealogical reasoning that is the other main dimension of household social relations. During sexual intercourse, substances from the father and the mother combine to form the body of the child. Using an agricultural metaphor, Chetris described conception as the father's seed (semen) being planted in the mother's field (womb). In the womb, the mother nourishes the seed so that it develops into a human body. The paternal white seed becomes the bones and other 'hard' parts such as nails; the mother through her nourishment of the child in the womb contributes the 'soft' parts of the body, principally flesh and blood. This indigenous biology is embedded in the common saying, 'a child's bones come from the father and the blood and flesh from the mother' (see also Kondos 1989, Ostor and Fruzzetti 1982). Further, Chetris said that the hard parts of the body are enduring as evidenced by the fact that after cremation, the bones remain while the flesh is consumed. As a result,

continuity through generations inheres in the enduring parts of the body--the bones--which are the contribution of the genitor. Thus it is through men and their contribution to the substance of the child in conception that there is the possibility for continuity of the person over generations.

The realisation of generational continuity in time through marriage, sexual intercourse with a woman, and the birth of children are the bases of the almost exclusive emphasis on the patriline for descent reckoning. Because it is the male substance which endures, a corollary interest of every Chetri householder is that sons are conceived in the passion of sexuality. Sons ensure the father's continuity and 'conditional immortality' (Bennett 1983:37) in two ways. First, according to the conception beliefs, the son's body shares enduring substance with his father's. It is for this reason that Chetris said the father is reborn in the son and in his son's son, and so on into the future through an unbroken line of men who, in sharing a common substance, can be seen as a patrilineage. Second, it is son's duty to perform the mortuary rites which transform the deceased parent from a disembodied ghost (*bhut-pret*) into an embodied ancestor (*pitri*) and which maintain the ancestor until it is eventually reborn (see Gray 1987)⁵. This is another instance in which the father is reborn and another way in which he achieves conditional immortality, this time through the ritual practices of the son which create an unbroken line of ancestors through the father, his father's father, and so on backward in time.

Chetris distinguished various levels of agnatic inclusion and continuity in terms of the generational depth of the apical individual and the territorial domain in which he and his descendants are located. *Bangksha* is loosely equivalent to the anthropological concept of 'clan'; members of each Chetri *bangksha* posit a common ancestor and tend to live within a region such as the Kathmandu Valley. *Khalak* loosely corresponds to the anthropological concept of 'lineage'; *khalak* members can trace their descent--the Chetris of Kholagaun have a written genealogy--from a common ancestor and are associated with a particular village or hamlet surrounded by their individually owned agricultural land. *Santan* refers to a 'domestic descent group' which usually consist of the eldest male as household head and his sons, and in a joint household his son's sons, all of whom share rights of access to the agricultural land that forms the domestic estate.

Brahmin-Chetri marriage cannot be understood apart from these descent groups because it is not merely a relation between a man and a woman. Rather marriage establishes particular relations between each of these agnatic descent groups. What is interesting is that the hierarchical nature of the relation varies depending upon which descent group is being considered. Chetris asserted that marriages are arranged between people who are of

equivalent hierarchical status. However, as a result of marriage, this egalitarian relations is transformed into a hierarchical one in which the wife-giving santan becomes inferior to the wife-taking santan and khalak. Yet simultaneously, this same marriage generates relations of hierarchical equality between other Chetri khalaks and bangkshas which allows them to make the arrange isogamous marriages.

Before explaining how Brahmin-Chetri marriage has both egalitarian and hierarchical consequences, two issues concerning the relation between marriage and the hierarchy-equality configuration need to be explored. The first is the particular nature of hierarchy in Nepal; and since through marriage women establishes relations between agnatic descent groups, the second concerns Brahmin-Chetri conceptions of women and gender relations. I deal with these two issues in turn in the following sections.

Two Paradigms of Hierarchy

From Dumont's perspective it seems sociologically correct to say that a modality of all Brahmin-Chetri domestic relations is hierarchy. However, to do so fictionalises the ethnographic situation in at least two important ways. First, it suggests that Brahmin-Chetri social relations are mutually congruent but this is belied by their diversity and potential incoherence. I take up this point later with respect Brahmin-Chetri conceptions of women and domestic gender relations. Second, hierarchy appears as an abstract, objective and monolithic phenomenon which it is not for the Chetris of Nepal. Instead, Chetris explicitly recognise two forms or paradigms of hierarchical relations. Each paradigm consists of a model of interactions between two types of beings whose ascribed characteristics place them in a hierarchical relationship. Each paradigm also specifies the kind of interactions -- including exchanges of gesture and things -- their meaning and logic which define one being as superior and deserving of those actions that constitute him/her as such and reciprocally constitute the inferior as such.

Puja-Prasad

One hierarchical paradigm concerns relations between humans and divine beings differentiated and ranked in terms of purity (*shudha*, *jharra*). When Chetris talked about purity in general terms, they referred to it as a socio-religious state which requires continuous efforts by people to offset the polluting effects that mere physical existence has upon them. Dumont (1980) echos this understanding in his recognition that purity is a relative state which expresses the Hindu value on the separation of organic life from social life. Accordingly, a state of purity is achieved by *tapas*, that is by ascetic actions of abstinence from and/or non-involvement in organic and natural

processes as well as passion (*kama*) and consequent attachments of life in the world. Through *tapas* a being produces not only a state of purity but also a form of spiritual energy and knowledge which enables the being to exert some control over those phenomena abstained from in achieving purity. *Tapas* and the purity and spiritual energy generated by it define the attributes of divinity. The greater the level of abstinence and/or non-involvement in the passions of social life, the greater the purity, the greater the spiritual energy and control over those phenomena abstained from, and thus the greater divinity and higher rank than those beings achieving less *tapas*.

Deities epitomise divine beings. They exist in a realm separate from the human world and this is a vivid iconic representation of their non-involvement in the world and consequent greater purity and spiritual energy than humans. Accordingly, deities have the power to affect the lives of villagers, their passions and the organic and natural processes in which they are intimately involved. This is the basis of the central relation of the *puja-prasad* paradigm of hierarchy: the right of deities to be worshipped (*puja*) and their powers to grant boons in the form of blessings (*prasad*) to humans, that is, to control the phenomena of the world from which they detached for the benefit of humans. The *puja-prasad* paradigm entails the reciprocity of worship and blessing and incorporates notions of divinity, adoration and humility.

The specific ritual practices of the *puja-prasad* relation vary in complexity and grandeur from the simple act of 'Namaskar' performed while the worshipper mentally expresses devotion and adoration of the divine to large scale rites orchestrated by one or more Brahmin priests involving the most elaborate *solah-so-upachar* (service of sixteen) which consists of decorating the divine with coloured powders (*tika*) and offerings cleansing water, pure foods, flowers, cloths, precious metals and *dhog* or *namaskar*. However elaborate, all these ritual practices are understood by Chetris to consist of two principle rites. In *puja* humans worship the divine through the offering of *tika*, pure foods and flowers; in *prasad* the worshipper receives the reciprocal blessing of the divine in the form of a *tika* on the forehead, consuming some of the pure food and wearing some of the flowers that were offered to the divine.

Deities are not the only divine beings deserving of worship. Humans may achieve limited states of divinity, purity, spiritual energy, knowledge and control through *tapas*. For Chetris there are two types of humans who are considered divine. The first is Brahmins. Their divinity and grater purity derive from their birth into the Brahmin *jat* and from the greater detachment from the passion of the world achieved through the ascetic practices that characterise their life style: vegetarianism, performance of ritual (which itself

involves ascetic practices in order to be in a pure enough state to approach the more divine gods), and knowledge of the sacred universe obtained through study of the texts and through the performance of rituals.

The second types of divine human is especially relevant to the household and role of marriage in the constitution of hierarchy in gender relations. Chelibeti -- a man's sister (*didi*, *bahini*), and the sisters of his father and sons -- are explicitly likened to gods. Chetris say, 'Chelibeti are equivalent to deotas and therefore are deserving of worship'. While the divinity of chelibeti is still based upon the purity consequent on tapas, it has a different derivation than that of the Brahmin. Chelibeti's divinity and greater purity relative to their brothers is not directly inherent in the bodily substance of their birth in the first instance as it is for Brahmins. As members of the same Chetri jat, chelibeti have the same bodily substance as their brothers. While like Brahmins the divinity of sisters is founded on ascetic practice, it is also domestically circumscribed. In the household they share with brothers, sisters and divine chelibeti because they abstain from the passions of sexuality. Yet this is precisely the context in which brothers as Householders and their wives fulfil their dharma and their desires and consequently establish attachments to the world through passion. The important point I wish to emphasise here is that in the context of the Brahmin-Chetri household and in relation to its core domestic descent group (*santan*), marriage distinguishes between two distinct forms of Chetri womanhood -- divine sisters and, as we shall see, ambiguous wives -- and two forms of hierarchical practices. As in the relations with Brahmins, Chetris conceive of relations with chelibeti in the same terms as relations between themselves and divinity. In those context in which sisters are divine, interactions are organised by the *puja-prasad* hierarchical paradigm.

Mannu Parne

The other hierarchical paradigm is *mannu parne* (literally 'having respect'). It is the model which Silwals allude to when describing the nature of social relations between people who consider themselves to be of equal purity. Jat or caste is precisely that segmentary level of society in which people's bodily substance is deemed to have the same level of purity. Since a person's bodily substance is derived from his/her father and mother and since marriage necessarily entails sexual intercourse in which the father's and mother's substances combine to form the child, marriage is the most important practice constituting and socially recognising the partners, their household, lineages and clans as equally pure and ultimately the Chetri jat as a distinct social domain. Chetris in Kholagaun insisted that proper marriages could only take place between people of equal status. Thus in arranging marriages they

carefully scrutinise the purity of self and other. Such scrutiny focuses not only on those practices of daily life which affect the continuing purity of the person (i.e. diet and occupation) but also on the past marriages contracted by the household and close agnates of potential spouses. In this sense, the Chetri jat consists of all those household, lineages and clans with whom marriages have been contracted in the past or may be contracted in the future. That is, a jat consists of one's kin or potential kin. As a result, the mannu parne paradigm of hierarchical practices operates between actual and potential kin who for the purposes of normal daily interactions are not differentiated in terms of divinity and/or purity. Since all household members are conceived of as kin, it is the mannu parne paradigm which Kholagaun Chetris themselves used in interpreting the nature and structure of domestic social relations and their hierarchical character.

In mannu parne relations, kin are differentiated and ranked in terms of age, generation and/or gender: authority and respect inhere in superordination and obedience and deference in subordination. Among those household members who are lineal or collateral agnates, age and generation are the primary criteria of status: 'elders' are superior to, have authority over, and are deserving of respect from 'youths'. Within the same generation it is relative age which defines 'elder' and 'youth'; older siblings, regardless of gender, have superior status over younger siblings. Between generations it is generation which defines 'elder' and 'youth'; lineal and collateral agnates in the ascending generation, regardless of gender, have superior status and the concomitant authority and respect. Among those household members related by marriage, gender is the primary criterion of status: husband is superior to wife. Gender, however, does not define status relations between the wife of a santan member and other in the household. In marriage, there is a joining, a merging, of a woman with her husband. Consequently, she assumes his mannu parne status relations and appropriate conduct with other members of the household. Thus, regardless of her relative age, she is 'elder' to all her husband's younger siblings and their spouses and 'youth' to all her husband's older siblings and their spouses as well as to her husband's lineal and collateral agnates of the ascending generation and their spouses.

It is in terms of these two paradigms of hierarchy that we must understand Brahmin-Chetri conceptions of women and domestic gender relations for these form the basis of explaining how marriage engenders the configurational relations between hierarchy and equality.

Domestic Kinship, Marriage and Hierarchy

On the model of Levi-Strauss' 'unit of kinship' (1963:43), the following analysis is based upon the resolution of domestic kinship into a set of dyadic

relations. I focus only on the two dyads that concern gender relations between men of the santan and their wives and sisters.

Husband-wife

This relation is one of the two main axes of the household. Gender as culturally constructed determines mannu parne status. It is not maleness *per se* that establishes the husband's superordination nor femaleness *per se* that accounts for the wife's subordination. Ontologically, it is men as husbands who personify Grihashta dharma, the goal of moral action in the world and thus encompassment, domestic holism and superordination while women as wives are the means by which men fulfil dharma and thus personify the encompassed part and subordination. It is the association of husband with Grihashta dharma that partially renders understandable the common saying, 'a wife should treat her husband like a god'. This is not an empirical statement about the divine character of husbands; it is a metaphor which refers to the closer association of men with the holism of the sacred cosmos. Socially, an homologous whole-part relation holds between men and women in the domestic group: the household and its continuity over time is defined by and is one of the most important interests of the core santan; it is the fertility of wives of santan members that is the means of producing it.

For Chettri men and women, marriage is the most significant event in their lives since it marks the transition to being Householders. Their lives culminate during this ashrama--no one from Kholagaun is remembered to have taken up the Vanaprastha or Sannyasa ashrama. It is in the state of married householders (culturally this is redundant) that the most valued goals (i.e. raising children, living in a joint-family household, ensuring one's conditional immortality) may be achieved and at the end of which, having achieved these goals, people may die with contentment.

The wedding ceremony, therefore, is for Chettris the most important of the Hindu life-crisis rituals (*samskara*). It is a long and elaborate affair lasting at least two days and combining solemn Hindu pujas with more playful rites in which the bride and groom create firsthand the practical knowledge that enables them to act appropriately as husband and wife. It is the first occasion in which they actually do towards the person who will be the spouse the bodily movements, actions and spatial relations that are the typical expressions and invoke in consciousness the typical meanings, dispositions and emotions of being husband and wife. While observing wedding ceremonies with me Kholagaun Chettris spontaneously identified several of these rites which of them portrayed the most characteristic aspects of the relationship between husband and wife. All of them concerned hierarchy and together provide a relatively comprehensive cultural account of their

knowledge and understanding of the hierarchical relations specific to husband and wife.

The early stages of the wedding rituals are dominated by the more solemn Hindu pujas which sacralise the couple and culminate in the rite which transforms them into husband and wife, *kanya dan*-- the gift of the virgin. Kholagaun Chetris' exegesis of *kanya dan* combined in a quite specific way *mannu parne* respect with *puja-prasad* and its themes of purity and pollution. The word 'dan' means a non-reciprocated gift given to the pure and divine-like Brahmin priest during worship. Like offerings of rice and pure foods made to the gods in *puja*, *dan* gifts also consisted of edible products whose integrity and wholeness had not been destroyed by human action. Virgins (*kanya*) have a similar quality of integrity and wholeness and thus are also considered pure and appropriate as *dan* gifts. In calling this rite *kanya dan*, then, offering a pure virgin in marriage is explicitly homologous to a *dan* given to a divine being who in this context is the groom. In effect, the rite associates the concept of divinity with that of the respect due to the husband. It is at this point that the equality which characterised the status relations between the bride's and the groom's agnates is transformed into a hierarchical relations. *Kanya dan* renders the wife-giving family inferior to the wife-takers. These experiences are confirmed in a rite of *gore dhune* which immediately follows *kanya dan*. In *gore dhune* conceptions of purity and impurity again are used to give a particular inflection to the nature of the bride's *mannu parne* inferiority. In *gore dhune* members of the wife's household and lineage wash the feet of the couple the most impure part of their bodies-- allowing the water thus made impure to fall from their feet into a vessel. The bride's agnates then sip the impure water thereby rendering themselves inferior to the groom's agnates with whom the bride is now joined.

After this, the mood and character of the rites become lighter but they continue on this theme of expressing the nature of *mannu parne* relations between husband and wife in terms of purity. After *gore dhune*, the bride sits on the inauspicious and inferior left side of the groom, at various times she does the most respectful form of *dhog* by touching her forehead to the groom's feet, and she eats food made impure by being previously eaten by the groom (*jutho khaune*). These latter two rites (*gore dhune* as well) are forms of what Harper (1964) calls 'respect pollution'. In coining this phrase, Harper implicitly saw such rites as juxtaposing the *mannu parne* attitude of respect with the quality of purity and pollution central to *puja-prasad* and indicating that both forms of hierarchy inform these practices as well as the relation between husband and wife.

In these rites, the expressions of the wife's subordination derive their force

from her appropriating her husband's bodily impurity. In dhog, the bride brings the most pure part of her own upper body -- the head - into contact with the most impure lower part of her husband's body -- his feet. Jutho khaune is based upon the impurity (*jutho*) transferred through contact with bodily secretions. In the act of eating, a person's hand becomes polluted by touching saliva in the mouth and consequently the food on the plate becomes polluted. Accordingly, by eating the food polluted by her husband, the wife voluntarily polluted her body and make herself less pure than her husband.

In these rites acts which in everyday life render people relatively pure and impure are used to create experiences of mannu parne superordination and subordination between husband and wife. The significance of this is that purity - pollution is a metonym of the other hierarchical mode-puja-prasad-and consequently of relations between humans and the divine in which the criterion of superordination is purity. As a result the stark respectful mannu parne hierarchical mode is experienced in terms of the ideas and beings Chetris associate with purity and pollution.

As we have seen previously, purity is epitomised by deities and divine beings who are regarded as beneficent and capable of granting boons to humans; and this is another dimension of the trope that a wife should treat her husband 'like a god'. Further, the other side of the trope is impurity which constitutes a danger to the pure and is personified in witches (*boksi*) and the malevolent disembodied spirits of the dead (*bhui, pret, pichas*). In a woman's conjugal household, the mannu parne and puja-prasad, the literal and figurative dimensions of her wifely status, together structure the experience of her subordination that conflates inferiority, pollution and malevolence. The wedding rites render her subordinate to her husband who is metaphorically divine. Further, she enters his household as an outsider whose loyalty is suspect and this twists the logic: it is undeniable that her husband is literally an insider and metaphorically divine and that she is literally an outsider, and this is sufficient cultural evidence that her metaphorical impurity could become literal and she could turn into a malevolent witch. For Kholagaun Chetris, the motivation for a wife to effect this transformation from the figurative to the literal is contained in their ideas about other malevolent beings.

In village beliefs only women can be evil and malign witches; and for the household members who reason from the perspective of the core santan, it is only in-marrying women-the subordinate outsiders-who are considered to be potential witches. A woman is thought to learn witchcraft from her mother (herself an outsider in relation to the core santan of her conjugal household) and her first victim is her husband himself or her son/the husband re-born.⁶

A wife position in her husband's household and the potential motivations

attributed to her are analogous to the impurity and malevolence of disembodied spirits of the dead (bhut, pret, pichas). Bhut, pret and pichas are the spirits of people who died prematurely and unnaturally either through accident, witchcraft or suicide (see Gray 1987). As a result of their unnatural death, mourning rituals are either not effective or not performed. For those who die naturally, mourning rites (*kriya* and *shraddha*) performed by close kin of the deceased purify the pollution of caused by death, re-embodiment the spirit and transform him or her into an ancestor who lives in the realm of the ancestors and receives annual offerings of food as remembrance. Bhut, pret and pichas are disembodied spirits who remain in the polluting state of death because they cannot become ancestors. They are spiteful, angry and bitter beings destined to roam the human world at dawn and dusk--iconic symbols of their interstitial or outsider character--neither in it nor in the realm of the ancestors and who consequently threaten the human world with sickness and misfortune that are the manifestations of their pollution and the power deriving from it to disrupt normal social relations. They are continually seeking the offerings of food through which humans remember and honour their ancestors. Thus when they attack people and make them ill, part of the cure is to appease them with food offerings.

Persons in jats inferior to Chettri combine the same characteristics: inferiority, outsidership, danger, pollution and the resulting power to disrupt normal social relations. The point to make here is that wives in relation to their conjugal household, disembodied spirits of the dead in relation to the human social world and inferior jats in relation to Chettris are potentially and analogously threatening. In each case, their outsidership and subordination accounts for their motivation to malign actions and pollution accounts for their power to effect them.

However, unlike disembodied ghosts and persons of lower jat, the domestic domain is ambivalent for the wife because she is not just potentially a witch; she is also the only member of her husband's household with the beneficent power that enables him to fulfil his dharma.⁷ I briefly illustrate this ambivalence of Chettri wives in the practices of husbands and wives addressing each other.

In Chettri households, members do not address each other by personal names. When referring to one's spouse in informal conversations with other villagers, Chettris use the term *jan*: and when formally introducing one's spouse to someone from outside the village, Silwals use the terms *sriman* (husband) and *srimati* (wife). However, when addressing one another, a husband and wife avoid using personal names as well as these Nepali kinship terms for spouse, husband and wife. When addressing his wife, a Chettri has two alternatives. One is to use the name of the village in which his wife was

born with a feminine suffix. For example, one Kholagaun Chetri's wife was born in the village of Chobar; around the house he calls to her or addresses her as 'Chobari'. In using this form of address, the husband is emphasising that the woman is by birth an outsider to the village, to the household and to its core *santan*. This is significant because one aspect of domestic kinship is that an outsider must be allowed to enter the group in order to perpetuate.

The other alternative form of address is the use of the teknonym 'mother of (son's name)'. In discussing the topic of their wife's name, Silwal men said that they felt ashamed to call their wives by their personal names; many claimed that they did not even remember it! Soon after birth, chetris are given two types of names. One name is given to the child on the eleventh day after birth as the primary task of a rite call *nuaran*. For this rite, the household priest constructs an astrological chart based upon the position of the planets at the time of birth of the child. This chart foretells the fate of the child and indicates which letter of the alphabet is to be the first letter of the child's name. On this basis and after performing a Hom sacrifice, the priest bestows a formal personal name on the child which is appropriate to its fate as determined by the position of the planets at the time of birth. This name is referred to as the child's *nuaran nam* and is normally used only for official purposes and for official documents. Most Chetris also have what is known as a 'calling name' (*bolaue nam*) which is given to them by the father and mother a few weeks after birth. The delay allows the parents to select a name that reflects a characteristics of the child. The calling name for boys may refer to some attribute of the child's martial nature as a Chetri- *Mahabir* (Hero), *Khadga* (Sword), *Yuddha* (Fighting); for girls it may reflect some feminine attribute - *Gita* (song), *Gayatri* (a verse from the Rig Veda recited in morning and evening devotions), *Nani* (young female child), *Punywati* (Virtue); and for children of both genders it may reflect the emotional relation between parent and child- *Prem* (Love), *Pranai* (Beloved).

Naming in Nepal is never mere nominalism. Names reflect the person's constitution either derived from the astrological position of the planets at the time of birth, from the *jat* of the child or from the nature of the intimate relation between the child and parents. Both the formal name and the calling name are given the child in his or her natal household, are based on events and relations occurring there, and are thus intimately associated with the identity of the person as a member of the natal household. In claiming to forget his wife's name a Chetri man is 'forgetting' his wife's birth in another household, her strong emotional relations with members of that household, her origin as a outsider and her consequent malevolent potential to cause disruption and sickness; in using a teknonym which describes her as the mother of his son he emphasises her beneficent power to enable him to

fulfilling his dharma and the resulting strong links to her conjugal household both as wife and mother of the core santan.

Together the two alternative modes which Chetri men use in addressing their wives are practices in which is embedded their doubleness. They are outsiders whose loyalty to their husband's household and santan is suspect because they continue to maintain important social relations with their natal households, especially with their brothers. In giving birth to sons they are also essential for the fulfilment of the husband's dharma and the realisation of his socially constituted interests: i.e. the ideal joint family, the continuity of his santan, lineage and clan, and the insurance of his (as well as her own) conditional immortality. Moreover, a Chetri woman only fulfils herself as woman in marriage and motherhood- that is, roles which are defined in relation to her husband, his santan, and dharma.

To briefly summarize, the husband-wife relation constitutes hierarchy as a complex appropriation of both puja-prasad and mannu parne. Belonging to the household by virtue of his birth, the experience of the husband's superiority and respect is tinged with encompassment, purity and divinity: gaining admission to the household through marriage, the outsider wife is experienced as an inferior and potentially dangerous being as likely to perpetuate the household through the birth of sons as to destroy it through witchcraft.

Brother-sister

In some respects this relation is the most complex of all in the household. It consists of an ensemble of practices and experiences which resonate with major themes from all the other core relations of the household. Moreover, it is the social relationship which Kholagaun Chetris described as the most relaxed, open and emotionally as well as materially supportive. While brothers and sister described their relationship in terms of both hierarchical paradigms, they did so without the negative valences of other household relations: there is not the restraint as between father and son, the danger as between husband and wife, or the conflict as between brothers. Instead it combines hierarchical benevolence, cooperation as well as purity and divinity.

As siblings, birth order is the criterion of mannu parne status, elder sibling having authority over and deserving of respect from younger sibling. Further as was the case with the husband-wife relations, cross-gender character of this relation introduces into the mannu parne status relations purity and the concomitant puja-prasad practices but in a reverse form. Far from being the polluting and potentially dangerous outsider, a sister is a pure, divine and benevolent insider.

The puja-prasad paradigms is the source not just of metaphors of mannu parne hierarchy in cross-gender relations, purity and impurity, benevolence and malevolence are synecdoches for men to understand the nature of the women and their relations to them. The wife and sister respectively typify the negative and positive forms of supernatural power, both of which are entailed in the puja-prasad paradigm.⁸ While wives are potentially malevolent boksi, sisters are chelibeti - humans with a divine quality and hence deserving of worship.⁹ In this sense they are more than mannu parne kin, they are *pujya* - worshipable - thus linking in consciousness a positive valence of the worship (puja-prasad) mode with the respect (mannu parne) mode of hierarchy. Unlike the husband - wife relation, where the negative dimensions of the puja - prasad paradigm (impurity and danger) are subjected to the control of the mannu parne paradigm, in the brother-sister relation the divinity and benevolence of the sister suffuses the hierarchical experience.

There is an important feature of this analysis of Brahmin - Chetri women and gender relations that remains ethnographically inchoate. So far women's place in the domestic scheme of things and thus the hierarchical character of gender relations has mainly been discussed as warranted in Grihastha dharma - they are means to Brahmin - Chetri men realising their sacred duty and social projects. Yet, as both wives and sisters they have been portrayed as powerful beings, malevolent and benevolent. By linking the puja-prasad paradigm to the mannu parne in domestic gender relations, I have also implied that the source of women's power lies beyond the social world. It is necessary to address this issue before attempting to bring together all the threads of the paper in analysing how marriage and gender relations constitute the configurational relations of hierarchy-equality in the Chetri jat.

Dassain: The Encompassment of Shakti

Gender relations and hierarchy in domestic social relations are the subject of the culmination of the annual festival of *Dassain*. In presenting an analysis of a central rite of the festival, I recall some of Valeri's comments on the nature of ritual. Valeri (1985) writes that in the performance of ritual artificial situations are created so that the 'typical' or 'model' experiences that constitute the enabling conditions of social life can be generated in the consciousness of the participants¹⁰. Further, in actually performing ritual the participants reproduce...

Society by reproducing dispositions that are at the same time bodily, emotional, and mental. To obtain this effect, the subject must be stimulated not simply to decode messages from other peoples' gestures, words, emotions and so forth, but also to learn how to reproduce them. He must therefore acquire the "practical" (in

Bourdieu's [1980] sense) knowledge that makes it possible for him to act, feel, speak, and think in the prescribed way ... Moreover, the "understanding" that ritual creates is an understanding of the premises of the cultural system. But these are fundamentally implicit and unformulated: the only clear knowledge that exists about them is that they can be "felt" -- and felt to have an effect on action and mental dispositions -- in certain experiential situations. These are precisely the situation created by ritual. These ritual situations, in turn, regularize and emphasize certain elements of diffuse, everyday experience that are associated with the "practical" or "inchoate" apperceptions of the presuppositions of the cultural system as reflected upon by the acting subject (Valeri 1985:344).

Dassain, celebrated in the month of Aswin (September-October), is the most joyous, auspicious and important festival in Nepal. The explicit theme of Dassain is the victory of goods over evil. The agent of this cosmic victory is the Goddess and her power, shakti. In the analysis of domestic kinship presented thus far the focus has been on the nature of social relations and practices as these occur in everyday life. Given the domestic ontology and its transformation into the socially constituted projects in which men attempt to realise the dharma of the Householder, women have been portrayed as subsumed and encompassed by men, as the means for men to fulfil their dharma. This, however, is only one aspect of the constitution of woman in Nepal; the importance of the Goddess is another and Dassain is a celebration of it.

Almost everyone in Nepal can recount the mythical events and characters that Dassain commemorates. In doing so Nepalis bracket them off from the human world by locating in a different era (yuga) and in a different realm from the one humans inhabit. More particularly, in performing the rites of Dassain, Chetris create a situation in which, by sacrilising a woman as the goddess, she is temporarily disengaged from domestic social relations with men--the very relations in which she fulfils herself as a social being. Dassain portrays the female and her power in her own right and presents the implications of woman in this state for reflection by participants, both male and female.

In explaining the meaning and significance of Dassain to me, Chetris recounted two stories (*katha*) which are celebrated in the rites and activities of the festival. One story concerns Lord Rama's victory over the evil King Ravana of Lanka who had kidnapped Rama's wife, Sita. During her captivity Sita remained faithful, not yielding to the sexual advances of Ravana. Lord Rama's victory over Ravana was assured through the worship of Durga and her reciprocal blessing for the success of his battle. The other story is about Durga as the defender of the gods and the slayer of demons. Here Durga slays the buffalo-demon, Mahisasura, who could not be killed by man or beast

because each drop of his blood spilled during a fight turned into another equally fierce demon. Durga in her fierce form was able to kill the demon by drinking his blood before it touched the ground. There is an important ending to this story. After using her powers in defeating Mahisasura and drinking his blood, Durga becomes intoxicated, takes on the form of another avatar of the Goddess, the terrible and bloodthirsty Kali, and goes on a rampage of destruction and death. Durga/Kali is stopped only because the god Shiva lies on the ground in her path. When Durga/Kali treads upon him and beholds his face, she is quietened.

These mythical exploits of Sita, Durga, and Kali depict some of the characteristics of the powers of the cosmic female principle, *shakti*, personified in the Goddess, *Devi*. They manifest the attributes of woman qua woman, and in relation to them Chetris men construct typifications of the women in their social world. Chetris' understanding of the source and nature of *shakti* was revealed in how they used the appellation 'Devi' in naming female beings. 'Devi' occurs at three levels: it names the personification of the general female principle, *shakti*; it also is the name for one of her avatars, the Mother Goddess, representative of fertility and the potential for reproduction; and upon marriage a Chetris woman's middle name is changed from Kumari (virgin) to Devi. In its use as the name of the Mother Goddess, Devi sacralises female procreative powers; in its use as the middle name for married woman, Devi marks the legitimate social context or its fulfilment and what for Chetris men and women is the dharma and ultimate aim of a woman's life in society--to marry and in that state use her procreative power to bear and raise children for her husband. A woman fulfils her social being and legitimately actualises her *shakti* through marriage and motherhood.

The avatars of Devi, Sita, Durga and Kali, are the 'heroines' of the stories celebrated in Dassain. They are commentaries on the janus-faced character of *shakti*. Sita is the image of the virtuous and devoted wife who remains faithful to her husband throughout her captivity. Her faithfulness typifies the controlled and therefore legitimate use of *shakti* through its encompassment by her husband resulting in the benevolent and creative potentials of her procreative power being the means for her husband's to realise his dharma.

The Durga/Kali image of the second story portrays the destructive and terrifying consequences of uncontrolled *shakti*, that is, female procreative power independent of male social encompassment. Recall the ending of this story: Kali's uncontrolled rampage is quietened when she treads on Shiva. There are two facets of this event which need comment. First, Kali's rampage is quietened by Shiva's presence. When Chetris talked about Shiva, they associated him with Parvati, his wife, who is another avatar of Devi. In this respect, Shiva is their image of Householder and 'husband' par excellence,

and it is in relation to him that the uncontrolled, destructive and illegitimate use of her powers are quietened. Second, in telling the story, Chetris pointed out that Kali's sudden calming stems from her horror at treading on Shiva, the husband. Here again the theme pollution signals that the relation between husband and wife is suffused with the supernatural power of women, shakti. By treading on Shiva, Kali is polluting him because not only is Shiva in the spatially inferior position below her, but she is also touching him with the most polluting part of her body, her feet. This is the source of her horror for she is reversing the normal relation between husband and wife. It is a reversal because Kali's inverts the respect pollution gesture that takes place between the bride and groom during the marriage rites in which the bride does *khutta dhog*: she touches the most pure part of her body--her head--to the most impure part of her husband's body-- his feet. This rite is an iconic representation of one of the central dimensions of the husband-wife relation: it involves her physically experiencing her subordinate status in terms of pollution; and she does so 'voluntarily'. Together these are the metaphors by which the wife accepts her encompassment by her husband. It is in this state that her shakti has a benevolent character. Kali's actions are the inverse: being intoxicated by the blood of the demon, her actions are involuntary and destructive rather than creative; she pollutes the archetypal husband; and in her horror she allows her powers to be re-encompassed by him.

The narrative structure of the story is as follows: it begins with shakti as Durga unencompassed by implicitly male gods and being used properly for the good of the world in defeating the demon; but this victory also unleashes its destructive potential until it is again encompassed by man in the form of husband. The processual structure of the festival while paralleling the narrative structure of the story expands upon its commentary.

While Dassain's themes are cosmic, the celebration of the rites expressive of them firmly locates their significance in the domestic world. The festival begins with female power independent of male control but ends with its re-encompassment by men. Dassain lasts two weeks, ending on the full moon day of the month. On the first day, known as *ghatastapana* (*ghata*= water vessel, *stapana*= to establish), every household in Kholagaun sets aside a corner of the house where the water vessel is to be placed. The household priest performs a puja inviting Durga to reside in the *ghata* for the duration of the festival. When Durga enters the vessel, it becomes the *goddess*. In this puja, the *ghata* is covered with cow dung and placed on a two-foot square of soil. Barley seeds are planted both in the soil and in the cow dung covering the *ghata*. The Brahmin priest returns to the house each morning for the next nine days to worship Durga on behalf of the *pariwar*. By the tenth day, the barley seeds have grown into six-inch stalk called *Jamara*.

By opening the celebrations with ghatastapana in which on behalf of the household the priest worships Durga, Dassain portrays theme of shakti in a state disengaged from men and herself encompassing the household and its male santan. The ghata is not only Durga who in the myth uses her shakti to reinstate the normal social order destroyed by the demons but is also potentially the bloodthirsty and uncontrolled Kali. So it is shakti in its controlled and beneficial form as well as its potential for death and destruction in its uncontrolled form that stands alone in the middle of soil planted with barley seeds. The ritual icon for Durga used in Dassain privileges the procreative aspect of shakti. The placement on and decoration of the ghata with cow dung and the Jamara which grows in it recall the agricultural metaphor for conception--male jamara seeds (semen) are planted on female field (womb).

The tenth day of Dassain is 'Tika Day' and is the culmination of the festival. On this day and over the following three days, every member of the household receives Durga's blessing ('Durga Prasad') and honours those kins deserving of respect. After completing the puja to Durga, the Brahmin priest acts as mediator between the Goddess and humans by distributing the signs of her blessing (prasad) to the members of the household. The distribution takes place in a strict mannu parne hierarchical sequence beginning with the most senior member of the household and ending with the most junior.

The Durga Prasad interactions involved the exchange of three items: it began with the Brahmin placing a tika consisting red and yellow powders and a mixture of red-coloured rice and curds on forehead of the male household head; then strips of red and white cloth are tied around his right wrist (bandhan); and finally a small bunch of jamara is placed on his head then secured behind his right ear. During these actions the Brahmin chants a blessing for the welfare of the pariwar. Once complete, the male household head reciprocated by placing a tika on the Brahmin's forehead, offering a gift of money (dakshina) and performing khutta dhog by touching his forehead to the Brahmin's feet.

Following this, the Brahmin distributes the Durga Prasad (tika, bandhan and jamara) in a series of dyadic interactions with each of the other members of the household in descending order of their mannu parne seniority. However, with them the reciprocal offering is attenuated; it includes only khutta dhog. The tika of worship and dakshina are not performed because they are offered to the Brahmin only once on behalf of the whole pariwar by the household head. Thus the wife of the household head is next because she is junior to him; but since he is senior to all other members of the household she is also senior to them because her status is merged with her husband's in relation to them. Here we see one indication of the re-encompassment of

women in Durga prasad. In a festival that celebrates the power of woman in the form of the Goddess, its culmination is a rite in which the shakti that a wife possesses as woman is limited and controlled by men. Such encompassment is achieved in society and isolated for reflection in Durga Prasad through the wife's mannu parne practices in relation to all other members of the household; in these her mannu parne status is derived from her husband's and not from any attribute she may possess independent of him. Following the wife, the Durga Prasad interaction took place between the Brahmin priest and the children by age. This finished the Brahmin's participation in the Durga Prasad; but the distribution of the blessing continued now with members of the household forming dyads among themselves and acting as givers and receivers of the prasad. These intra-household Durga Prasad dyadic interactions involved each individual squatting in front of each member who was junior in descending order to him/her and offering tika, jamara and a verbal blessing and receiving in return respectful gesture, usually dhog. The sequence and roles adopted by members of the household in the Durga prasad interaction proceeded according each member's mannu parne status. Thus in the first round, the household head places a tika on his wife's forehead, whispered a verbal blessing and gave her a bunch of jamara; in return she performed khutta dhog. He then replicated this interaction with every other member in descending order of mannu parne status in relation to him. In the next round, his wife as the second most senior person in the household did the Durga Prasad rite with every member junior to her in descending order of mannu parne status. In the third round, the next most senior person bestowed Durga prasad on those junior members. These rounds continued until everyone except the most junior member had bestowed Durga Prasad on his/her mannu parne juniors.

One aspect of the performance of the Durga Prasad rite relates back to the paradigms of hierarchy presented earlier. For Chetris, the act of bestowing a blessing, whether as a mediator between the divine and the human recipient or merely as a human expressing responsibility for the welfare of the human recipient, signifies status superiority; performing a reciprocal a gesture of respect acknowledges the latter's subordination. However, when these practices are appropriated into a festival celebrating shakti, the Goddess Devi and her avatars (Sita, Durga and Kali) and into a rite involving interactions between kinsmen who are members of a household, the meaning of these interactions for Chetri's conception of women and the experiences of gender relations with them is more specific. Kali, the uncontrolled, bloodthirsty, terrifying, merciless and destructive avatar of Devi is transformed into Sita, whose sexual power of procreation is encompassed by man in service of his dharma. The Sita image is typified by the mannu parne interactions between

husband and wife. In this sense, the *mannu parne* enshrines formality, restraint, encompassment and duty in domestic relations. Sita is the faithful, submissive, devoted and fertile wife whose sexual desire is channelled for the perpetuation of the husband and his conditional immortality realised in his *santan*. Uncontrolled sexual passion is considered by Chetris, but especially by the mother-in-law, to be an improper use of a woman's power which diverts a man's devotion away from his parents and brothers leading to conflicts within the domestic group. Here is one source of Chetri's construction of the in-marrying woman as a potential witch (*boksi*). Chetris recognise that a wife has the procreative *shakti* that is defied in the Goddess and which they worshipped in the sister. It is thus *shakti* that is the source of female divinity and basis for the *puja-prasad* paradigm of hierarchy being culturally relevant to woman's identity. But as the *Dassain* stories show, this power is ambiguous. A wife can be like the faithful Sita using her *shakti* in the form of procreative power for the benefit of her husband and his household; but she is potentially the inverse--suspected of using her *shakti* in the form of sexuality in an evil way not to fulfil her husband's *dharma* and perpetuate his *santan* by bearing sons but to destroy the household. This she may achieve in two ways; either her *shakti* becomes excessive and uncontrolled sexual passion which drains her husband of his semen and his vigour so that he wastes away, or she becomes a witch who uses her *shakti* in the form of curses placed upon her husband or son.

In this respect, *Durga Puja* describes a way to avert female malevolence. The *shakti* of wife can be controlled through scrupulous adherence to *mannu parne* practices which incorporate asceticism: in interactions with husband, she must act with restraint, lack of emotion and sexual attachment. Kali objectifies the dangerous but unseen potential of an in-marrying woman's uncontrolled use of procreative power; and just as Kali's rampage was subdued through her horror at contravening hierarchical practices, so too can the unseen and dangerous potential of an in-marrying woman's sexual passion be subdued by controlling her visible and public conduct with other members of the household and channelling her procreative power into the birth of sons. This is perhaps another level at which *Dassain* celebrates the victory of good over evil.¹¹

While gender has little affect on the details of the *Durga Prasad* interaction between most members of a household, when they are performed between men and their sisters or daughters, there were significant changes indicative of the particular nature of *chelibeti* women. *Durga Prasad* interaction with them begin in the same manner as with other *mannu parne* kin: when they are interacting as *mannu parne* juniors, they received the *tika* signifying *Durga*'s blessing and their *mannu parne* subordination from their father and brother.

However, instead of receiving the reciprocal dhog gesture, men each offered chelibeti dakshina and dhog--the same offering made to a divine Brahmin in ritual contexts.

The point to emphasise here is that in Dassain Durga Prasad rite Chetri men pattern their interactions in accordance with their typifications of the two forms of shakti and females who live in their households. In the performance of Durga Prasad, they clearly distinguished between their chelibeti and their wives, worshipping the shakti of the former and attempting to encompass the procreative power of the latter through the public imposition of the ethos of the mannu parne. The attenuation of the mannu parne aspects of the Durga Prasad with chelibeti is just one aspect of the devoted and indulgent approach taken by men toward their sisters and daughters. In her natal household after marrying, a woman remains a chelibeti and her husband takes on her divine character. In her conjugal household, she assumes the mannu parne status of her husband in his household. When she visits her father's and/or brother's household she is free from household chores; she and her husband are offered the finest and purest food cooked in clarified butter (ghee) by her brothers' wives. In her conjugal household, the same woman is excluded from this exalted state and is expected to strictly adhere to mannu parne forms of interactions; formal, obedient, restrained, unaffected by emotional attachments.

The in-marrying woman is an outsider who is both committed and confined to her conjugal household: committed because it is as a wife and mother that she realises herself as woman in Nepali society by enabling her husband to realise his dharma and to ensure her husband's as well as her own conditional immortality: confined because she must strictly adhere to the tight and unemotional control of mannu parne relations that offsets what is seen as her natural tendency to be too attached to the world. Such attachment is expressed in the stereotype of women as insatiable. The divinity of her procreative shakti as chelibeti in her natal household become the evil potential of sexuality in her conjugal household.

The analysis of the complexities of Durga prasad and domestic kinship reveals a more general point about marriage and its implications for the relations between hierarchy and equality in Brahmin-Chetri social life. In those relations involving men (i.e. father-son and brother-brother) the mannu parne mode alone orients the experience of hierarchy, albeit with the various shadings of restraint and benevolence in the father-son relation and of equality, cooperation and conflict in the brother-brother relation. However, it is in the cross-gender relations that the supernatural-oriented puja-prasad mode becomes significant in the experience of hierarchy. A further complexity is that there is a gender specificity to that experience. For men there are two

types of women in their households. Wife and sister typify two forms of supernatural intervention in human affairs: pollution/danger/malovenence and purity/divinity/benevolence. The supernatural beings associated with each form of intervention--ghosts and demons on the one hand and deities on the other--personify the types of action associated with inferior and superior positions in a hierarchical structure. Further, a husband's *mannu parne* authority is threatened by pollution and the malign power of demons; conversely a brother's *mannu parne* relation with his sister (whether younger or older) is overshadowed by her divinity and her being deserving of worship.

For women there are two types of households--conjugal and natal--in which they may claim membership. In each there is a different experience of the relation between the *mannu parne* and *puja-prasad* modes of hierarchy. In the former as a wife she experiences the overbearing and confining authority of her husband and her mother-in-law who attempt to control her potential danger through scrupulous adherence to *mannu parne* interactions. In her natal household, the structures of *mannu parne* are greatly relaxed and she enjoys the adoration and trust of her brother and his wife.

The significance of this gender specificity in the experience of hierarchy in cross-gender household relations is threefold. First, from both male and female perspectives there is an ambivalence in the general concept of femaleness and its relation to hierarchy, though the ambivalence has a different character for men and women: men experience inferiority and superiority as occurring with distinct and separate female persons of different nature; women experience inferiority and superiority as dimensions of an existential being in different households such that their ambiguity is contextual. Second, as an ambivalent being woman has the character of mediator. This is one dimension of Brahmin-Chetri marriage that is emphasised in this paper. Third, the household contains the structural atom for understanding wider-scale social units: an agnatic descent group linked to other descent groups through women of positive or negative supernatural valence. Accordingly the way relations between hierarchy and equality in such wider-scale social units organised by agnatic descent groups greater depth (i.e. *khalak* and *bangksha*) may be partially explained in terms of the form of female mediation linking the household or other social groups whose core is an agnatic descent group on the model of the *santan*. I conclude the paper by briefly illustrating how marriage mediates and constitutes the particular relation between hierarchy and equality that characterises the Chetri jat in the Kathmandu Valley.

Conclusion: The Chetri Regional Caste

By 'Chetri regional caste' I refer to the local conception that Chetris living

in the Kathmandu Valley form a distinguishable section of the Chetri caste which extends throughout Nepal. The basis for distinguishing a regional caste within the Kathmandu Valley is that it forms the usual territorial limit of marriage. Thus one pre-condition for the distinctive identity of a social group is a set of kin conceived to be associated with a territory. This provides only a partial description of the regional caste as understood by Chetris themselves. It may also be described using social concepts at three levels of kinship. The regional caste may be analysed as set of clans among whom marriage is prescribed; as a set of localized lineages (i.e. like the Kholagaun Chetri lineage) linked by actual and potential marriage; or as a set of households linked by marriage and by potential or exogamously proscribed marriage. Whatever the level, there is a basic structure: a set of agnatic descent groups--clan, localized lineage, household santan--linked by marriage or potential marriage. These various levels of agnatic descent group are extensions on time and space of the household father-son dyad. the clan is distinguished from localized lineage and household by its lack of formal association with a specific territory: localized lineages and households of each Chetri clan are spread throughout the Kathmandu Valley and beyond. Despite this difference, the common image for the affinal connection between agnatic descent groups recalls Levi-Strauss' unit of kinship: the linked dyads husband-wife/sister-brother.

The issue raised by this conception of the regional caste is that marriage constitutes different relations of hierarchy-equality among the agnatic descent groups at each level. At the clan level, all are considered of equal status enabling marriage among all the clans to be isogamous and to constitute the *jat* as a distinct segment of Nepal society. However, at the household level, there is a hierarchical relation between the superior wife-taking santan and the inferior wife-giving santan. At all levels marriage binds the descent groups into a recognized unit but the status implications of marriage vary. These ethnographic facts highlight marriage as the crucial relation for the nature of the Chetri regional caste.

Experientially, marriage is first and foremost a problem for the household. Generally it is the senior man and his wife who expend a great amount of time and effort finding a suitable spouse for the unmarried men and women in their household. At this level marriage involves the linked dyads of husband-wife/sister-brother and focuses attention not on relations within the household but between households.¹² In the search for a spouse, they consider households of all Chetri clans--except those prohibited by rules of exogamy, i.e., father's, father's mother's, mother's father's and mother's mother's *gotras*¹³--to be of equivalent purity and status and thus potential affines. As we have seen previously both the husband-wife and brother-sister dyads

incorporate a notion of hierarchy based on purity and the puja-prasad paradigm. Thus as a result of marriage, the relations between the households involved take on the hierarchical character of the dyad linking them: the wife's natal household (wife-giving) is considered inferior by the husband's household, and the sister's conjugal household (chelibeti-taking) becomes pure, divine and superior in relation to her brother's household. Here the equality in terms of purity between households identified by clan as potential affines is transformed by marriage into hierarchy between households identified as households of actual affines.

These hierarchical consequences of marriage affect the local lineages in the same manner as lineage brothers become impure through a birth or death. This means that marriage between local lineages may be repeated only if it hierarchically replicates previously remembered or extant marriages. If a Kholagaun Chetri sister marries into a local lineage in another village, that lineage would become superior in status. Consequently a Chetri could not marry a woman from that lineage--at least until the original marriage is 'forgotten', because it would confound the hierarchical relation already established by the previous marriage. The Kholagaun Chetri must look beyond such affinal local lineages for a spouse. Analytically he or she may marry into a different localized lineage of the same clan as an existing affinal lineage. However, Chetris do not think about it in these terms. Once the reference moves beyond existing affinal lineages, the potential marriage universe is conceived of as a set of households identified primarily in terms of their clan affiliation. At this level of thought, marriage may occur in 'both directions'; and this exchange is both the cause and effect of the nullification of any hierarchical implications of marriage for Chetri clans. Here hierarchy between households and localized lineages identified as actual affines is transformed by marriage into equality among clans identified as potential affines.

One reason why this particular moment of hierarchy-equality transformation occurs is that unlike a household or localized lineage, a clan does not establish productive relations to a specific and identifiable territory. Thus there is not the easily recognizable corporate group to take on the hierarchical consequences of marriage. Being spread throughout the valley, there is no way for each household of the clan to keep up with the marriages of all the other members and to calculate the hierarchical implications for the clan as a whole. Since the concept of woman generated in household social relations incorporates purity-pollution, the linkage of clans by both wives and sisters effects the status equality among all of them. Socially, marriage between households centrifugally forms circulating connubium linking santan, lineage and clan agnatic descent groups and realizing the

transformations between hierarchy and equality. Experientially marriage constitutes in consciousness the hermeneutic relation between hierarchy and equality.

Notes

1. This paper was first presented at the American Anthropological Association Meetings in Washington, D.C., 1989. It was a part of a session on Marriage in the Himalayas organized by Nancy Levine and Tom Fricke. The theme of the session derived from Collier's then recently published book, *Marriage and Inequality in Classless Societies*. The Participants were asked to structure their papers in response to some issues raised by Collier. It is for this reason that I refer to her work in indentifying the problem addressed in this paper.
2. Dumont clearly distinguishes between 'inequality' which exist in societies where equality is the encompassing value and 'hierarchy' which exists in society in which it is the encompassing value.
3. See Gray 1980 for a critique of the appropriateness of this concept when used to indicate a marriage rule. It is more accurately a description of the result of marriage not a pre-condition of marriage.
4. When the term 'Householder' is capitalised, it refers to him as an ontological being characterised by dharma, that is, by unmediated and non-intentional action; when the term is non-capitalised (i.e. 'householder') it refers to the 'man-in-the-world's who engages in practice in order to realise socially constituted and meaningful projects in society.
5. The son also performs these mortuary rites for his mother who also becomes an embodied ancestor (pitri) and thus ensures her conditional immortality but not as part of a patriline. All genealogies I have seen are agnatic and include only men.
6. For a full account of the wife as a dangerous witch see Gray (1982) and Bennett (1983).
7. We will see shortly that this ambivalence of woman reflects a basic contradiction of a wife's place in domestic relations and functions.
8. The explicit core referent of the puja-prasad paradigm is as a mode of interacting with deities. But more generally it provides a mode of interacting with supernaturals of all kinds. Thus exorcists and other types of specialists dealing with malign spirits also use basic puja-prasad practices for interacting with demons and ghosts.

9. The brother-sister relation is the epitome of the underlying structure which is the relation between the men of the household's agnatic santan and women born to them. For example, a daughter is a chelibeti of her father and a father's sister is a chelibeti of her brother's son. Thus a man's chelibeti includes the following; sister, daughter, father's sister, son's son's daughter, and father's father's sister, and the relationship is extended to the husbands of these women and in some circumstances to their households.
10. Like Leach, ritual is phenomenon out of normal time and space; and like Geertz, Paul and Kapferer, ritual is a context in which the basic assumptions and ideas of social life are detached from their normal embeddedness and consequences in social life and held up for reflection.
11. As we shall see in the next section, it is women who have previously been in the same position but who have proved their loyalty to the household through the beneficent use of their procreative power who are seen as primarily responsible for ensuring that this malevolent potential of female shakti is not used against the household. It is a mother-in-law's duty to ensure her son's 'wives' scrupulous adherence to mannu parne practices.
12. In this sense marriage is one of the primary centrifugal social processes carrying the implications of household relations to inter-household relations.
13. Strictly speaking rules of exogamy apply to gotras. Among the Chetris there is a complex relation between gotra affiliation, clan and localized lineage. All members of the Chetri clan are also members of the Bharadwaj gotra. However in other Chetri clans, there may be two or three gotras, and some gotras include lineages from different clans.

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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN NEPAL: TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

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Introduction

On the basis of assumed causes influencing human movement, international migration can be broadly categorized into two groups: voluntary and involuntary (Peterson 1978). The present paper concentrates on voluntary international migration in Nepal although in many cases the difference between voluntary and involuntary movements may be unclear (see David 1970: 73-95).

The current population situation in Nepal results in part from both emigration and immigration. Historically, three forms of emigration are evident: (a) movement related to military recruitment, mainly Gorkha recruitment, (b) movement for agricultural and other economic activities in rural areas among low level wage workers such as *durban*, *kulli*, watchman and prostitutes, mainly to the urban centers of India, and (c) marriage migration. More than 90% of all emigrants are from Hills and the Mountains.

Immigration comprises both regular and periodic flows. The regular flow is the continuation of the past stream when people from North Indian plains were encouraged to colonize the forested areas of the Tarai. The Tibetans were also encouraged to conduct their business and settle down in Nepal hills until the termination of the salt trade. On the other hand, major periodic flows include: (a) the flow of Hindus (figure not known) from North India during 11th and 12th centuries as a result of Muslim invasion in India, (b) the flow of about 16,000 Tibetan refugees in 1959/60 due to political instability in Tibet, (c) the flow of Nepali-origin people from Burma because of Burmese Nationalization Act in 1964, (d) the flow of about 10,000 Bihari Muslims from Bangladesh around 1970s, and (e) a (return) flow of a considerable number of Nepali people who were forced to leave Nagaland and Mizoram in late 1960s. With a few exceptions, the stream of immigration is directed to

the Tarai.

This paper utilizes secondary sources to examine two major international migratory flows in Nepal, emigration from the Hills and immigration to the Tarai, and shows how various factors affect them. This assessment is based on secondary sources. The paper is organized into three sections. The first section provides a synopsis of the forms of emigration and immigration. The second section analyzes international migration in Nepal within the framework suggested by Weiner (1985). The third section identifies a few critical issues with regard to international migration in Nepal. Emphasis is placed upon migration between Nepal and India, especially of those migrants who have migrated for agriculture-related occupations.

An Analytical Framework

The patterns and trends of migration in Nepal have been widely discussed in recent literature (Kansakar 1974, 1983; Rana and Thapa 1974; Dahal et al. 1977; CEDA 1977; Shrestha 1979; Banister and Thapa 1981; Conway and Shrestha 1981; Thapa 1982; Gurung 1984, 1985; Sharma 1985a; Shrestha 1985). With a few exceptions (e.g., Gurung and Sharma 1986), no attempt has been made towards developing or applying an analytical framework to explain the migratory pattern.

Myron Weiner (1985:441-455) has suggested a framework for the analysis of international migration. He suggests that there are four clusters of variables shaping international migration. The first cluster is *differential variables*. It includes variables such as wage differentials and differences in employment rates and land prices. Many economic studies have emphasized these variables in explaining migration patterns (Todaro 1987; Greenwood 1969). *Spatial variables* such as distance and transportation costs constitute the second cluster. Many geographers and demographers have emphasized those variables as well. This cluster of variables seems quite similar to what Gradner discusses as constraints and facilitators in migration (see Gradner in De Jong and Gradner 1981:58-89). *Affinity variables* comprise the third cluster. Religion, culture, language, kinship network are the major variables in this cluster. Ritchey (1976:389) also lists a number of hypotheses, like the affinity hypothesis, the information hypothesis and the facilitating hypothesis. Weiner's cluster resembles some of these. The fourth cluster of variables comprises the *access variables*, meaning the rules for entry and exit.

Large-scale population movements across borders are induced by high differentials, small distance, close affinity and unrestricted rules of entry and exit. Weiner maintains that access variables are the crucial ones because individual decisions are intimately influenced by it, despite the heavy positive

influence of other variables. Again, unrestricted access allows migration even when the differentials are not that great. Let us see how these variables apply to international migration in Nepal.

Differential Variables

Wage differentials

It has generally been accepted that the direction of net migration is away from low wage regions towards high wage ones. Todaro (1976), based upon unemployment research in Kenya, posits that movement is the response to expected earning differentials, in his case rural-urban wage differentials. Because of the rural- to-rural nature of most Nepali emigration, rural-urban wage differential does not have direct relevance to the rational of migration. In the past, many Nepali emigrated to India and other countries not because they perceived wage differentials but because of their search for arable land for which North and Northeast India became the potential destinations. As a result, people from the Hills of Nepal colonized the relatively poor, sparsely settled interior parts of Sikkim, West Bengal, Assam and Kangra valley of India (Mandal1981).

This process of land colonization applies for both emigrants from Nepal and immigrants to Nepal. The initial clearance of the malarial Tarai forest and its settlement is due to Indian immigration in Nepal. Indians from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were mainly responsible for it (Regmi1977). In general, wage differential does not appear important in shaping international migration in Nepal.

Differentials in employment opportunities

In the past as well as present, non-farm employment opportunities in the Hills have remained extremely limited (Sharma1985b). Employment opportunities in India, on the other hand, existed in such areas as labour in tea plantations, border security, oil-fields, timber work and road construction in many areas in North and Northeast India. Employment in the British and the Indian Army has acted as an incentive for Nepali emigrants. From the early 19th century, the British Indian government had begun recruiting "Gurkhas" in their army. This avenue for employment enticed many young adults from the hills to join the British or Indian army. Stiller (1976:43) observes that around 1915 there was a large-scale recruitment of able-bodied men for foreign armies.

Davis (1951:117) indicates that Hill emigration for agriculture-related work to Darjeeling, Sikkim, and Bhutan remained steady for more than one-hundred and fifty years. Mandal (1981) states that the root of Nepali Hill emigration

and settlement in Northeastern India is employment in the British-Indian army, many of whom settled there following retirement. Moreover, in the early phase of tea plantation, oil mining and land clearance, Nepali laborers were in high demand (Dahal and Mishra 1987). Dixon (1977:110), by observing very low intra-district movement and high proportions of people living abroad, concludes that the relatively low level of domestic intra-district mobility reflected a lack of job opportunities in Nepal compared to India and elsewhere. Ojha (1983) also states that different economic opportunities available outside the country were responsible for Hill emigration.

With regard to immigration, the census of manufacturing establishments indicates 19% of the total laborers in the industrial establishments as immigrants (Sharma 1985b:79). This proportion is as high as 69% in industries that process primary raw materials. Immigrants were employed in skilled or semi-skilled categories and were mainly concentrated in the Tarai. This has been the case immediately from the establishment of industries in the Tarai in the 1930s (Dahal 1983a). Lack of required skilled and semi-skilled local manpower for industries in the Tarai provided employment opportunities to migrants from North India. On the other hand, for Nepali non-agricultural emigrants, the availability of low level jobs such as hotel boys, *durbans*, watchman, etc. in the India towns provided employment opportunities there. Thus, the role of employment opportunities appears important in Indo-Nepal migration.

Differentials in land prices

This variable applies to agriculture-related migrants and helps explain the direction of Indo-Nepal migration until the 1960s. Access to land is more important than the price differentials between the origin and destination. Up to the 1960s, land in the Tarai was easily available for emigrants as well as immigrants. Historically, the political regime in Nepal encouraged settlement in the Tarai areas in order to augment revenue accruable to the state. Since the hill people were reluctant to move to the Tarai, migrants from India were encouraged to settle in the Tarai. (The causes of reluctance among the hill people to move to the Tarai will be discussed later). Besides initial tax remissions, those who undertook the development of waste and virgin lands for cultivation were entitled to 10% of tax free land (*birta*) (Ministry of Law and Justice 1965:19). This is no more the case. But, in the past, it played a major role in attracting immigrants from the densely populated northern states of India.

Davis (1951:117) indicates that the practice of granting rice plots to tea state plantation workers seems to have augmented the number of Nepalis in Assam. The same was true for the Kumaon area of India, especially in the

Kangra Valley where the British government had established Gorkha settlements without the settlers having to pay for the land. Gaige's (1975:66) observation is that economic deterioration in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh together with the opportunity to obtain land either free or at a relatively little cost in the Nepal Tarai encouraged the people of the Gangetic plains to move there.

Differentials in population density

Density differentials have played a dominant role in shaping international migration in Nepal. The Tarai was sparsely populated up to the 1960s and it was necessary to encourage more people to settle in the region. The Hills, in terms of total arable land, were already densely populated. In the meantime, large-scale migration from the Hills to outside the country was also taking place (Gurung 1984). A comparison of population density in the Tarai with that in the adjoining districts of India reveals that density in north Indian districts is very high. According to the 1981 census of Nepal, the population density of the Tarai districts ranges from 80 persons per sq. km. (Kailali) to 366 persons per sq. km. (Dhanusha), with an overall average of 234 persons. On the other hand, even the 1971 census of India shows that only two among the Gangetic plain districts had a density to less than 250 persons per sq. km. (Kheri and Pilibhit in U. P.). Some districts such as Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Saran, etc. had a density of over 600 persons per sq. km. Density in north Indian districts has been increasing, and it will continue to do so at least up to the end of this century. Gaige (1975:66) points out that population density in eastern India districts was two or three times greater than in the eastern Tarai districts. The differential was even greater for those Indian districts adjoining western districts in the 1960s. This information suggests that Indian immigrants to Nepal have moved from densely populated north India to the relatively less populated Tarai areas.

Hill emigration from Nepal is also influenced by density differentials between the Hills of Nepal and the Northeastern hills of India. A comparison of population density between two areas shows a lower density in the latter. Sikkim had a density of 26 persons per sq. km. in 1971 whereas the corresponding figure for the Hill districts of Nepal was more than 80 persons per sq. km. This is one reason why Nepali emigrants from the hills might have moved to the sparsely populated Northeastern Hills in India.

Spatial Variables

Spatial variables are concerned with time, distance and space. In a simple gravity model formulation, migration becomes a function of "friction of space", i.e., as distance increases, the size of the migratory flow tends to decrease and *vice versa* (Zipf 1946). A number of studies have found an

inverse relationship between the probability of migrating and the distance between origin and destination. Greenwood (1969) found that in Egypt a 10% increase in home wages deterred migration as much as a 13.3% increase in distance. In the Nepali context, however, many ethnographic studies have shown that people from the central hills and mountains have crossed a considerable distance to north-eastern parts of India (Bruce 1934; Caplan 1970; Furer-Haimendorf 1975; Macfarlane 1976; Rose 1981; Dahal 1983; Fricke 1986). MacDougal (1968) reports the same situation in the western Hills. Dahal et. al (1977) also state that the people from the far western Hills have moved to distant places to earn a livelihood. Lall (1968) points out that many Nepalis from the hills have moved as far as Burma for better opportunities and land. Kansakar (1974) observes that many Nepalis worked in the Punjab army in the past. This means that proximity to the destination is not an important variable in hill emigration.

Distance, nonetheless, does appear to be a factor in shaping the immigration pattern in Nepal. The concentration of about 96% of China-born population in the northern mountain region and about 91% of India-born population in the Tarai shows that proximity to the areas of origin is one of the variables determining immigration pattern in Nepal. The Tarai is an extension of the Indo-Gangetic plain. Apart from the short distance, the relatively inexpensive Indian railway lines constructed during the British administration also facilitated the movement from north India to Nepal. The extension of Indian railway network up to the border of Nepal has a particularly positive impact on immigration to Nepal. The railway network also facilitated the Indian "gallawala" (labour recruiting agent) and rice traders to extend in their activities to Nepali villages.

Affinity Variables

People tend to move to areas with cultures and languages that are similar to those of their points of origin as well as areas where they have a kinship network. Weiner's third cluster focuses on these variables.

Culture and Religion

Many people of Nepal and India share a common religion and beliefs. A very large proportion of Nepalis and Indians are Hindus. As such, they observe the common festivals and visit temples and religious shrines in both the countries. There are considerable ethnic similarities among the people of India and Nepal as well as Tibet. This similarity is region-specific. Similarities exist between the Mountain people of Nepal and the Tibetan people across the Himalayas. The hill people are similar with the hill residents of India to the east and the west of Nepal. The majority of the Tarai

people are similar in their physical appearance and social behaviour with the people of the north Indian plain. Migration has followed these religious and cultural lines. The first migratory wave of Hill people was from the Kumaon area to the middle Hills of Nepal (Poffenberger 1980). People from Tibet migrated to the Mountain regions of Nepal until the termination of salt trade in 1959. The Tarai is dominated by descendants of migrants from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

Sharma (1978:1) notes that the Hindu-Tribal dichotomy is much less sharp in Nepal than in India. The resulting higher level of religious tolerance among Nepali people has also served to encourage immigration of Indians to Nepal.

A study undertaken by a National Commission on Population Task Force (1983) found that 79.3 percent of household heads among immigrants belong to similar Hindu social/ethnic groups existing in the Tarai.

Language

Nepali and Hindi, the national languages of Nepal and India, respectively, have their origin in Sanskrit and share the same script. Based on mother tongue data, the 1981 census of Nepal records Maithili and Bhojpuri as the second and third dominant languages in Nepal. In the Indian census, these two language groups are included within the Hindi language category (for detailed discussion of the problem and similarity of languages in the Nepal Tarai and North Indian plains, see Gaige 1975:100-125).

In the mid-western Tarai districts of Nawalparasi, Kapilvastu and Rupandehi, more than 85 percent people spoke Awadhi in 1961. In the contiguous border districts of Uttar Pradesh, according to the Indian census, 85 percent or more speak Hindi. Gaige (1975) argues that those classified as Awadhi speakers in the Nepali census seem to speak the same language which is classified as Hindi in the Indian censuses. The dialect of Doti, Dadeldhura, Darchula, and Baitadi, neighboring the Kumaon areas of India is included within Nepali in Nepal. This dialect (Kumaoni) is spoken by 96 percent of the people in the contiguous districts of Almora there. Gaige (1975) further notes that most of the speakers of Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi, and other tribal languages of the plain areas speak Hindi as a second language. He observes that about 46% of the total population in the Tarai speaks Hindi as a second language. Combining together the native speakers of Hindi and those who use it as a second language, a substantial percentage of population in the Tarai (63 percent) speaks Hindi (Given the 62.8 percent positive change in the Indo-aryan language group between 1952/54 and 1981 (Gurung 1985, unpublished paper). Given the growing commercial contacts between Tarai and India, it unlikely that the percentage of Hindi-competent

may not have declined in the recent years.

In a similar manner, a similarity exists in the languages used in the hill areas of Nepal and those of the northeastern (also northwestern) hills of India. The 1971 census of Sikkim showed that 64% of total population of the state listed Gorkhali (i.e., Nepali) as their mother tongue. In Darjeeling, where most people speak Nepali, the people of Nepali origin constitute more than half of the total population. Even in Bhutan, more than one-third of the national population is of Nepali origin and speaks the Nepali language.

Thus, linguistic similarities between the plains areas of Nepal and India and between the Nepali and Indian hills (both in the North and the Northeast) must have led to increasing cross flows of migrants.

Kinship Network

The kinship network across the border of the Nepal Tarai and North India is relatively intense. Marriages between Indians and Nepalis are common feature in these regions. Low caste and tribal people tend to marry neighboring villagers. Upper caste and upper class families frequently arrange marriages with families living many miles away. Many Hindus and Muslims in Nepal are either migrants or descendants of migrants from India. These families tend to maintain the close ties to their ancestral villages. Gaige (1975) in his study of Nepal Tarai observes that households continue to make marriage arrangements with affines and other distant relatives in ancestral villages. The presence of relatives and friends and thus the continual maintenance of close ties between the points of origin and destination has accelerated the wave of migration into the Nepal Tarai in particular. A recent survey (NCP 1983) finds that 12 percent of the migrant Indian household heads had migrated to the present location simply because of the presence of relatives.

In the hills, marriage between Nepalis and Indians is not as common as in the Tarai. However, it is generally observed that in the middle hills upper class Hindus tend to marry in Assam, Sikkim and Darjeeling areas as well as in the Kumaon area in the west. There is a tradition to marry in India among the ruling classes of Nepal. Marriage relationships represent a continual and active reinforcement of the cultural ties between the people of Nepal and India.

Within the affinity variable, another component that works through kinship is the demand for and supply of information and communication. In this connection, Ritchey (1976) emphasizes the impact of the information network in shaping international migration. Up to the beginning of 19th century, i.e., before recruitment was officially allowed in Nepal, young adults from the hills moved down to Indian towns armed with information and communication they had obtained through the kinship network. This has a

simple logic: no one leaves his/her home territory without any idea of where he/she is moving. Kinsmen are trusted to provide the most reliable information.

Similarity in Physical Habitat

This variable (not mentioned by Weiner) also shares in shaping international migration in Nepal, particularly for agricultural reasons. Besides those recruited or working as "durbans" and hotel boys in Indian cities and towns, people previously tended to move in areas with familiar environmental conditions. The people from the middle hills of Nepal migrated to the northeastern hills of India. Since there were no transportation facilities across the hills, such migrants had to cross the Tarai and the north Indian plains. Even though these migrants were exposed to the north Indian areas during their travel, they chose to settle in the hills of northeast India and Burma (c.f. Lall, 1968).

Up to the 1950s, the government of Nepal encouraged settlement in the Tarai. Ojha (1983) states that government policies encouraging hill people to settle in the Tarai met with little success even though the hill population was increasing rapidly, and large numbers of people were migrating to India. Tropical environmental conditions are usually mentioned as the deterrent for the settlement of the hill people.

While Nepalis were moving out from the hills to India, people from north India were clearing the Tarai forest and settling there. They were familiar with the tropical environment. They could sustain themselves in the climate. That the Tarai only attracted people from the Nepal hills only the planned settlement and malaria eradication programs indicates that environmental similarities are important factors in shaping patterns of rural-to-rural migration in agrarian societies.

Access Variables

The tendency to assume the primacy of differential, distance and affinity variables in migration literature has tended to diminish the importance of variables. This is partly because most studies have focused upon internal migration. Weiner emphasizes the role of the access variables in relation to the international migration. The rule of entry and exit of governments impacts in two ways. It can influence other variables that affect migration. In turn, other migration-influencing variables can influence the rule of access. Nepal allows unrestricted entry and exit vis-a-vis India. No passport or visa is needed for people traveling either direction. Any citizen of either country can freely move into the other and stay as long as desired. This situation explains much about the nature of movement between Nepal and India. The Treaty of

1950 has further enhanced the free movement between the two countries.

The unrestricted rule of entry and exit has played an important role in the flow of military recruits from Nepal to India. During the Rana period (1946-1951), especially when Jung Bahadur was in power, Nepal restricted the recruitment of Nepali adults in foreign army. The emigration rate of that period was very low. After Bir Shamsheer came into power (1885) there were no such restrictions. This led to heavy emigration from the hills. During the two World Wars, the government encouraged emigration for recruitment in the British Indian army. Kansakar (1974:63) mentions that during this period very few young adults of the "military classes" were left in the Nepal Hills. Recruitment to foreign armies continues, resulting in the emigration of many able-bodied young adults.

Unrestricted rules of entry have facilitated the movement of the people from neighbouring countries. Before 1959, there was much interaction and migration between Tibet and Nepal. The movement has declined after 1959. The last major flow was of the Tibetan refugees (about 16,000 strong) during the Tibetan rebellion in 1959.

The flow continues from the south. Given the unrestricted rules of entry, together with cultural similarity and low spatial distance, this flow seems unlikely to change its course in the near future. However, border regulations have been an important issue among administrators and politicians in Nepal (for detail, see the National Commission on population Task Force 1983).

Conclusion

This cursory application of an analytical framework opens up further areas for research on the nature of international migration in Nepal. The variables indicated above have affected international migration in different ways. At this point, without quantitative data, it is difficult to conclude the relative importance of each of Weiner's variables in shaping the international migration in Nepal. However, the above analysis shows that Nepali Hill emigration has been shaped primarily by the differential and the access variables. Affinity variables are limited to very broad similarities in religious and cultural beliefs.

Immigration is shaped by all the four clusters of variables. Employment opportunities, availability of virgin lands, demands for specific skills in the manufacturing sector and development project, shorter distance, close affinity in religion, culture, language, kinship network, and unrestricted entry and exit rules have shaped and stimulated Indian immigration in Nepal.

Weiner's list of the cluster of variables is not exhaustive. In addition to what he has listed, many variables such as density differentials, similarity in physical habitat, role of communication and information network all seem

relevant in Nepali international migration. Since his framework is quite open several other variables can be added and their relative importance can be examined.

Although the framework explain the pattern of flow of emigration and immigration in Nepal, some facets of international migration remain unexplained. One of these is the case of refugees. There has also been a growing indication that population shifts between Nepal and India have taken a circular nature in recent years. The framework, being concerned with voluntary and permanent nature of flow, does not consider these aspects of international migration.

In recent years, policy makers and administrators in Nepal have shown their concern about these streams, counterstreams that make up the total immigration picture and their consequences. International migration in Nepal has raised several issues of which some are politically sensitive as well. A few are briefly discussed here:

1. Many Nepali emigrants have moved to the rural areas of the India. They have occupied agricultural areas of low economic prospect. There are also Nepali emigrants in the cities of India. They hold very low-level jobs like coolies, durban, watchman etc. Immigrants, though previously destined to rural areas, are currently destined to urban ones. In many cases, they have displaced the Nepali labor force.
2. Considering the vast size and population of India, Nepali emigrants comprise a negligible proportion of the total population (less than 0.1 percent), and their impact is largely absorbed within the rural sector. On the other hand, Indian immigrants to Nepal are engaged in the urban and industrial sector. They comprise a significant percentage of regional population (6.4 percent in the Tarai). This may further enhance Nepali dependency with India in terms of skilled laborers. It might be that the productive sector of Nepali economy will remain more outside the control of the natives.
3. Emigrants are mainly from the hills. wherever they go, they identify themselves as Nepali. Immigrants are found reluctant to identify themselves as Indians. The 1983 survey of the National Commission on Population in the Tarai districts found that more than one-third of all foreign-born individuals declined to state their country of citizenship. Nepali emigrants are easily distinguishable from Indians, but it is difficult to distinguish Indian immigrant in the Nepali Tarai, given the similarities in complexion and physical appearance. In times

of political disturbance in either country, this has significant implications. The expulsion of thousands of Nepalis from Nagaland and Assam is a recent example.

4. Emigrants from Nepal are mostly unskilled. Immigrants are semi-skilled and skilled laborers, occupying important positions in the manufacturing industries (Sharma 1985). This situation is further exacerbated by the control over many industries in Nepal by Indian businessman and their preference for Indian laborers (c.f. Blaikie et al. 1980; Shrestha and Conway 1985).
5. Emigrants from Nepal show little concern for obtaining citizenship in Indian states (Gurung 1984). It is evident that in the student movement of Assam in the late seventies and early eighties, many Nepalis who had spent more than 25 years were deported simply because they lacked citizenship certificates. In contrast, given the similarities of the plains peoples and their extended cultural ties, it is difficult for the Nepal government to deny citizenship to Indian migrants, notwithstanding the exaggeration that more than half of the total "Indian origin" migrants to Nepal have not obtained citizenship certificates (Paramanand 1986:1006). It should be noted that the political instability in West Bengal and Assam is rooted in the issue of citizenship.
6. Studies show that a large proportion of emigrants intend to return home to Nepal. They move to areas of opportunity, live there for some time, and return (McDougal 1968; Weiner 1973). The majority of immigrants to Nepal, on the other hand, intend to remain. Gurung and Sharma (1986) report that about 97.1 percent of the immigrants indicated their intention to remain in Nepal. This might lead to further increases in man-land ratio and complicate the unemployment situation in Nepal.
7. Dixon (1977:123) indicates that emigrants were mainly single and seeking short-term employment. Among immigrants, about 41 percent had come in groups. Those who came with their families comprised about 11 percent (National Population Commission 1983).
8. Since Nepali emigrants in India are scattered in rural areas, they have marginal and only local impact on the political scene. On the other hand, immigrants can play an important role in Nepali national

politics. Gaige (1975) states that immigrants were in the forefront in raising the issue of regionalism in Tarai and demands for Hindi to be officially recognized as the national language of Nepal. Indian immigrants have emerged as an economically and politically powerful lobby within Nepal (Blaikie et al. 1980). Indian merchants control the commerce and construction sectors to a substantial extent (Conway and Shrestha 1981:34).

9. There is no evidence that the rate of emigration to India increased during the period from 1951 to 1961 (Weiner 1973:622). Dixon (1977:123) observes a constant rate of emigration in 1971. The same is true in the period between 1971 to 1981. Because of the nativist movement in India (for details, see Weiner 1978) and the high rate of natural increase, there is no reason to expect that India will be able to provide land or substantial employment opportunities for an increasing number of Nepalis in the future. On the other hand, provided the present situation continues, the flow of Indian immigrants in Nepal might continue.
10. In two Tarai districts surveyed by the Nepal FP/MCH Project, it was found that the fertility of Indian immigrants was not only the highest, but they were, as a group, the least receptive to family planning programs (Nepal FP/MCH Project 1981:311-48, cited in Thapa 1982). This may have important long-run demographic and political consequences.

The scenario of migration patterns portrays the fragility of the Nepal hill economy and an active population dynamic. The process and reasons for leaving the Hills still operated though the nature and location of opportunities have changed. Through emigration, Nepal is losing young able bodied, innovative manpower. Through immigration, it is bringing another nation. In the context of relatively small and land-locked country, as Gurung and Sharma (1986) indicate, immigration undermines the nation of sovereignty in political as well as economic terms. Unrestricted emigration and immigration, without any formal arrangement and understanding between the countries involved, does not serve the interests of the concerned nations. It has been general tendency that countries facing problems of immigration have shown a greater concern on this matter than countries facing emigration. By the same token, Nepal has shown greater concern about Indian immigration to the Tarai than India has.

A recent study on the carrying capacity in the Tarai has shown that the

Tarai, the so called 'breathing space' of Nepal, has reached its carrying capacity (National Commission on Population, 1948). Thus, the Tarai can no more be regarded as a safety valve. Since unrestricted rules of entry and exit seem to be important in shaping international migration in Nepal, prompt attention is needed in this direction. The implications of unrestricted immigration policies are quite evident in neighboring South Asian countries. Thus, besides regulating the border with India, specific programs and appropriate changes in industrial, labor, trade, and citizenship policies are necessary to regulate the influx of migrants to Nepal. Mutual understanding and bilateral cooperation between the Nepali and Indian governments is essential to come up with mutually acceptable solutions.

**Table 1: Population Absent Abroad
1952-1954**

Region	Number	Percent
Mountain and Hill	189,917	95.9
Eastern	49,553	25.0
Central	96,639	48.7
Western	43,725	22.2
Kathmandu Valley	2,911	1.5
Inner Tarai	3,472	1.8
Eastern	1,938	1.0
Central	1,318	0.8
Western	216	0.01
Tarai	1,830	0.9
Eastern	1,544	0.8
Central	163	0.1
Western	123	0.1
Nepal	189,120	100.0

Source: Population Census, 1952/54

**Table 2: Number and Change of Absentee Abroad
1961-1981**

Region	1961		1981		Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Mountain and Hill	305,257	92.9	355,467	88.2	50,219	16.5
Eastern	80,591	24.5	70,041	17.4	-10,550	-13.0
Central	150,502	45.8	202,598	50.3	52,096	34.6
Western	74,164	22.4	82,837	20.6	8,673	11.7
Kathmandu Valley	7,089	2.2	4,449	1.1	-2,640	-37.2
Inner Tarai	6,626	2.0	13,510	3.4	6,684	102.1
Eastern	3,341	1.0	3,127	0.8	214	6.4
Central	2,766	0.6	4,029	1.0	1,263	42.7
Western	519	0.2	6,354	1.6	5,835	1124.3
Tarai	9,529	2.9	29,542	7.3	20,013	210.0
Eastern	7,155	2.2	14,063	3.5	6,908	96.5
Central	1,899	0.6	9,217	2.3	7,318	385.4
Western	475	0.1	6,262	1.6	5,787	1218.3
Nepal	328,470	100.0	402,977	100.0	74,507	22.7

Source: Population Census 1961, Vol. II.

Population Census 1981, Vol. IV.

**Table 3: Foreign-Born Population in Nepal
1961-1971**

	1961			1971		
	Region of Enumeration					
Country of birth	Mountain & Hill	Tarai	Total	Mountain & Hill	Tarai	Total
India	13,498	310,661	324,159 (96.1)	15,851	306,867	322,718 (95.6)
China	8,050	11	8,061 (2.4)	1,500	34	1,534 (0.5)
Other*	1,903	2,982	4,885 (1.4)	4,624	7,871	12,495 (3.7)
Other**	143	372	515 (0.1)	605	96	701 (0.2)
Total	23,594 (7.0)	314,026 (93.0)	337,620 (100.0)	22,580 (6.7)	314,868 (93.3)	337,448 (100.0)

Note: The figure in the parenthesis indicate percentage.

* Other Asian Countries.

** Other Countries

Source: Population Census, 1961.

Population Census, 1971.

Table 4: Foreign-Born Population in Nepal, 1981

Region	Total	India	China	Other Asian Countries	Other Countries
Mountain	1,819 (0.8)	867 (0.4)	706 (0.3)	203 (0.1)	43 (0.0)
Hill	11,122 (4.7)	8,453 (3.7)	1,278 (0.5)	1,025 (0.4)	366 (0.2)
Tarai	221,098 (94.5)	212,958 (91.0)	497 (0.2)	6,599 (2.8)	1,044 (0.5)
Nepal	234,039 (100)	222,278 (95.0)	2,481 (1.0)	7,827 (3.3)	1,453 (0.7)

Note: The figures in the parenthesis indicate percentage.

Source: Population Census, 1981 Vol I.

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BOOK REVIEW

Botes: The Ferryman of Tanahun. 1989. Suraj Subba. Ashok Kumar Limbu and Kumar Bahadur Rai, Damauli, Nepal. Pages 112. Price Rs. 200/-

It would be unfair to judge a non-academic book from an academic standpoint. Books coming from the pen of enterprising writers led by sheer curiosity can also serve useful purpose and hold our interest. This book by a non-specialist in anthropology on the Botes, one of the lesser known and economically weaker tribes or ethnic groups in the Tanahun district of central west Nepal, falls in this category. It has been designed as an ethnological manual on a people adversely caught up in the development and modernization process in Nepal. The book's aim is to evoke a sympathy for Botes among the general readers hoping that it will eventually lead to some action plans for the betterment of their lot, although the author does not say this in so many words.

The Botes are presented with respect to their habitation and demography (chapters 1 and 2), social organization and sacraments (chapter 3), beliefs and religion (chapter 4), and land and economy (chapter 5 and 6). There are, pictorial illustrations elucidating Bote life style and economic activity. The author's research on the Botes has brought to light three old documents referring to the Botes of Bairenighat and their occupation as ferrymen. These mention landrights conferred on them by the state in return for rendering their service. The oldest of these documents goes as far back as 1765 A.D. prior to the date of Nepal's unification in the time of the Sen king, Harakumardatta Sen, of Tanahun. The name Bote suggests not only a distinct cultural and ethnic group, but also indicates a specialised occupation of rowing boats on rivers. Botes, along with Majhis, have for centuries made their living by ferrying people and goods across rivers in their primitive wooden dug-outs. The state of Nepal had also depended on the service of these ferrymen for smoothly maintaining its communication lines along the main trails of the country, in the 18th and the 19th centuries.

The book purports to give an account of the present day life of these people and the 'socio-economic realities' facing them in one district--

Tanahun. Many hitherto unknown ethnological details regarding them are described in the book. Botes are generally ranged with other peoples living in the warm subtropical riverines of the middle hills and the foothills of the Churia range, such as the Majhi, Kumal, Darai, Danuwar, etc. The Botes are said to be divided into two already formed endogamous groups: the Pani-Botes and the Pakhe-Botes. The latter are sometimes referred to also as Majhis. Obviously, the book is more a study about the Pani-Botes than the Pakhe-Botes.

The Pani-Botes are a more impoverished group, yet they reveal a culture in their rituals which otherwise appears to be purer than that of the Pakhe-Botes. As their name suggests, even today their economy links them to the river. Not only do they still row boats, they try to supplement their meagre income from this and from the practice of their little agriculture by river-fishing and gold-panning. They construct weirs across the river which is the favorite mode of fishing. Their religion reveals a large pantheon of deities and spirits whom they keep appeased through various rites.

Their traditional landholdings rights which the state seems to have given them on payment of annual rent in recompense for conducting ferry service, has been called their *kipat*. Like the *kipat* land in other areas of Nepal, the *kipat* of the Botes previously seems to have been held collectively on behalf of all the Bote members of a village. This has, however, changed in modern times and holds no longer true. In the face of growing poverty, their land is fast slipping away from them into the hands of stronger socio-economic groups. Most lands belonging to the Botes nowadays consist of dry unirrigated *pakho* land with very little paddy land. All this leads us to conclude that the Botes are one of the most vulnerable economic groups of Nepal today. All these ethnological details are an invaluable addition to what has been reported by Marc Gaborieau and Dor Bahadur Bista so far on them.

In recent years, the already precarious existence of the Botes has been further threatened by the process of development and modernization. The construction of the Prithvi highway and the subsequent development of Damauli as the district headquarters of the Tanahun District have displaced Botes from its vicinity. They feel unhappy to live in the new settlements where they have been obliged to move (p. 17). Apparently, the district administration took no consideration of the willingness of these people to settle down in these new villages. Furthermore, their traditional occupation of rowing boats on rivers in the hills is threatened with extinction because of increasing numbers of bridge constructions over rivers (P. 72). In a few places where boats still ply, this job is contracted out to people who can successfully bid higher amounts to the district administration, breaking the Botes traditional ferrying monopoly.

In the face of these odds, where is the redemption to the Botes likely to come from? A policy of national development showing no particular regard to the protection of the weaker sections of Nepali people, such as the Botes, may not prove any beneficial for them. Mere availability of new economic opportunities is not a sufficient condition, because adaptability to the new situation does not easily come to people who have remained for centuries under many forms of socio-economic handicaps. Education among the Botes is appallingly low. There is so far not a single SLC pass student among them (pp. 94-95). For such people, an indiscriminate pressure of development will more likely be a bane rather than a boon.

– Prayag Raj Sharma

Notes to Contributors

Manuscripts should be typed double-space on A4 paper with a 4 cm margin on all four sides. The top copy should be submitted and photo/carbon copy retained by the author. The author should underline nothing except words which are to be italicised. Notes and references should be typed double-spaced on separate pages and will be included at the end of the article. The text should refer to notes numbered consecutively throughout the article, using raised numbers; bibliographical references should be cited in the text by the author's last name, date of publication, and page number, e.g., (Bista 1965:105) or if the author's name is mentioned in the text, by the date and page reference only, (1965:105). Entries in the references should be in alphabetical and chronological order of authors. They should include the details in the following order: name of the author (s)– surname first, date, title, name of the periodical, volume number (Arabic numerals to be used throughout), pagination (for articles in periodicals and books with several authors), place of publication (and name of the publisher for a book). Examples of the style to be used are as follows:

Bista, D.B. 1965. *People of Nepal*. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar

Dhungel, Basundhara. 1980. "The Newars." In Sudha Paneru (ed.), *Traditional and Prevailing Child-Rearing Practices Among Different Communities in Nepal*. Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan university, pp. 31–53

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Tables should be submitted on separate pages, numbered and with headings. Maps and text figures should be drawn in black waterproof ink about twice the intended final size, with lettering in soft pencil. Notations in the text should indicate where these are to appear. Plates should not be less than intended final size. They should be printed on glossy paper. They should be titled and numbered.